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Dear Readers,
Our 20th issue of SAGAR constitutes a shift in presentation.  We have 
elected to forgo print in favor of online publication to accommodate a wider 
spectrum of both academic scholarship and audience.  An understanding of 
South Asia often involves image, sound, and interactivity, in addition to text. 
In coming issues, we hope to utilize tools afforded by our new format to 
become a more comprehensive resource for scholars interested in South 
Asia.  
The works found in this issue deal with transitions as well.  Sutapa Ghosh’s 
essay illustrates responses to a changing modern landscape.  Michael 
Brattus Jones calls upon us to shift our presuppositions regarding written 
language in ancient South Asia.  Finally, the transformation of gender roles 
is given new light in studies by Hafsa Kanjwal, Shenila S. Khoja-Moolji, and 
Yogita Sharma.  
We wish to thank the South Asia Institute, our editors, and writers, for their 
assistance during our own transition. 
Sincerely,
Matthew D. Milligan and Dan Rudmann
Co-editors in Chief
Email: sagarjournal@gmail.com
Web: http://sagarjournal.wordpress.com
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Role of Communities in Shaping the Urban Built 
Environment: A Case Study of Bandra-Kurla Complex and 
Dharavi in Mumbai
by Sutapa Ghosh
Introduction1
This paper looks at urban planning and land-use changes in the city through an 
empirical study of the Bandra-Kurla Complex and Dharavi areas of Mumbai.2  Bandra-
Kurla is being developed as a Central Business District (CBD) with part of it housing the 
International Finance and Business Centre. In a bid to develop this into a global 
financial centre, urban planning and policy making processes implemented by the 
government are pushing people to the margins as, for example, a part of the area now 
housing the poor is becoming gentrified due to market-led forces.3  This study looks at 
the change in urban governance processes as multiple players, including corporate, 
NGOs and the private sector emerge in a race to reconstruct the image of Mumbai into 
a “global-city” through their visionary ideas resulting in the gentrification of poor 
neighborhoods. However, the poor do not give up their struggle with the state over 
issues of housing and land rights. They come together on issues of common concern 
6
1 Paper presented as part of the Texas Asia Conference at the University of Texas, Austin. 11th & 12th February, 
2011. Ph.D. Research support in the form of Teaching Assistantship received from the Department of Humanities and 
Social Sciences, IIT Bombay for the period July 2006- 2010.  I extend my gratitude to Professor D. Parthasarathy, my 
supervisor and Prof. P.L. Trivedi (co-supervisor) for guiding me through this process. Additional support received 
from SARAI, CSDS, Student Fellowship for the period March-December, 2007.  
2 Bandra-Kurla Complex is located in the H/E ward and Dharavi located in the G/N ward, is a slum concentration 
close to it, within the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai or the Brihan Mumbai Municipal Corporation
3 Gentrification connotes ‘urban regeneration’ leading to the displacement of working class residents from urban 
centres due to high real estate prices in central place locations. It is a market-led socio-spatial transformation which, 
evolved in 1990s into a crucial urban strategy for city governments in consort with private capital in cities around the 
world. (Neil Smith 2002), 438-440.  
for their cause and are evolving a participatory model of development to affect public 
decisions and the urban built form.
Objective of the Study
This study will try to illustrate how different actors along with the state (i.e. politicians, 
corporate, NGOs and communities affected) play a role in shaping and reshaping urban 
space and the built environment in Mumbai.4  It will investigate how networks and 
alliances built by the poor and their social capital affect urban planning and political 
decision making of the state, thereby shaping space and the built environment.5 
Research Methodology
In order to study the urban process and the built environment in Mumbai, a field study 
was undertaken in the Bandra-Kurla Complex and Dharavi areas from 2007 to 2009. 
Personal interviews and group discussions were carried out to understand the peoples’ 
collective struggle and resistances and the strategies they adopt in order to have a 
voice in urban planning, politics and policy making of the state. Apart from this, 
government documents and records as well as state legislative assembly debates also 
provided valuable information pertaining to the planning and spatial management 
strategy of the state.
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4 First coined by Harvey, David (1981) “built environment” refers to the urban form which is shaped by capitalist 
processes. In his paper on ‘the Urban process under Capitalism’ he says that we need to understand the dialects 
involved in the urbanization process- which is that urban process affects urban form and this form puts a constraint 
on further development of capitalism. He says that the built environment of production (factories) and consumption 
(housing) gets built as accumulation goes on for the sake of accumulation through the exploitation of labour and this 
results in a crisis in built environment and when this happens there is there is a ‘sectoral’ switching crisis where 
capital flows from one sector to the other and a ‘geographical’ switching crisis where capital flows from one place to 
the other.  
5 According to Sudha Mohan (2005) development becomes meaningful as a process of change only when the poor 
and the marginalized can enhance their own lives through the interaction among themselves in order to solve 
problems of common interest. This form of civic solidarity which is based on partnerships and participation helps in 
gaining social trust which spills over trust in government.
Methodology Adopted for Looking at Cities
In order to explain and understand the socio-spatial transformations it was necessary to 
draw upon several theoretical discussions. Firstly the theories of urban governance 
given by David Harvey were relevant because this study situates itself in the era of 
globalization which saw the transformations of urban governance from the welfarist 
model to the neoliberal model.6 Secondly the critique of neoliberal theories given by Neil 
Smith (2002), Neil Brenner (2002), and Nik Theodore (2005) were important for an 
understanding of the gentrification process resulting from market-led forces. The paper 
also looks at the concept of ‘political society’ considered by Partha Chatterjee (2002), to 
be a democratic form of modern institution and different from the “civil” society. Hence 
urban planning in capitalism is studied here “from the entire realm of class relations 
wherein labor has its own social character by virtue of its function as a social mediating 
activity and not merely in terms of exploitative class relations.”7  In short, the study 
focuses on the people’s protest movement, people-centered decision making 
processes, and how marginalized communities forge links and collaborate with the civil 
society and the state through an analysis of urban planning and policy making. 
Opening up Bandra-Kurla Lands for Development
The study will first explain the history of planning, and the spatial management strategy 
of the state with respect to Bandra-Kurla Complex (BKC), for an understanding of the 
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6 See Harvey’s discussion (1989), 3-17 on the change in urban governance from ‘Managerialism’ of the 60s to 
‘Entrepreneuralism’ of the 80s 
7 Moishe Postone (1996) quoted in Noel Castree, “Envisioning capitalism geography and the renewal of Marxian 
Political Economy” Trans Institutional British Geography NS 24 (Royal Geographical Society, 1999), 150, Here 
Postone (1996) refers to all elements of social life and social relations, beyond the workplace and not only 
exploitative class relations and extraction of surplus value. Castree (1999) draws our attention to post-structuralism 
and post-colonialism by saying that identity politics, gender and environmental studies are now emerging fields of 
study, and that this is a dramatic shift from the core Marxist approach of class and capital..
urban planning process of the state. The history of development and planning of BKC 
can be traced back to the early planning documents prepared by the municipal engineer 
N.V. Modak and a New York planning consultant Albert Mayer. Modak and Mayer 
created a city-centric plan to decongest the island city and relocate heavy industries 
beyond suburban Thane Creek and light industries to the Salsette. (Figure 1). This was 
the time when the concept of zoning as a spatial management tool was introduced as a 
solution to the congestion problem (CIDCO 1979).8   Subsequent government reports 
echoed the same notion. In 1971, Ben King headed the World Bank Mission to Bombay 
and his report stressed the need to decongest the island city by shifting offices to the 
Salsette in Bandra-Kurla Complex and to the mainland in Navi Mumbai.9  This was the 
first time that Bandra-Kurla lands were considered for development. The report also 
suggested relaxation of FSI in the suburbs and restrictions in the city where the FSI was 
as high as 4 and 5 so as to make it more livable for the upper classes in the elite 
neighborhoods of the island city (King 1971).10 The World Bank is known for rolling out 
neoliberal ideas of planning (Kennedy and Zerah 2008), and this guided city planning 
from the 1970s onwards. In Smith’s description of neoliberal urbanism, the 
centralization of capital in central areas of the city makes it unaffordable for the working 
classes and forces them to commute from peripheral areas where rents and real estate 
values are lower (Smith 2002) and this is precisely what was happening in Mumbai. 
Wholesale establishments and state government offices were also slated to be shifted 
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8 According to Lefebvre (1994) zoning is an abstract space created by planners and practitioners based on 
mathematical  modeling and rationality and has a frightening capacity for violence. 
9 London and New York and other developed countries had already tried out this policy of deindustrialization and de-
proletarisation of city-centres (Smith 2002).  
10 Floor Space Index or Floor Area Ratio is a certain permissible land to construction ratio. It is also the development 
right as it prescribes how much construction is permitted on a piece of land (Nainan 2008). For e.g. a FSI of four (4) 
on a 500 sq. ft plot would mean the builder is permitted construction for a maximum of 500*4 sq. ft area or 2000 sq. ft. 
which can be done through the addition of floors. 
to Bandra-Kurla Complex on the recommendations of subsequent government planning 
committee reports (Figure 2).11  
 In 1993 however, the landuse policy began to be structured around the theme of 
economic liberalization and the government decided to set up the International Finance 
and Business Centre (IFBC) in the ‘G’ Block of Bandra-Kurla Complex (MMRDA, 
Tender Booklet 2008 & Maharashtra Legislative Assembly Debates 1997).12  In 
accordance with this, a technical report for setting up an IFBC was prepared by Cooper 
and Lybrand Pvt. Ltd. in 1993. Tendering in this block became limited to the financial 
sector, including banks, the stock exchange and other financial services. In regard to 
this, the back office operations of major banks were shifted BKC to save on high rents, 
while the headquarters continued at Nariman Point at the southern tip of the island city 
(Nijman 2007). Leading corporate houses were also given land here (figs. 3 & 4) 
(MMRDA, Tender Booklet 2008).
Vision Mumbai Report & Transformation in Urban Governance 
After liberalization, the government along with several corporate organizations and 
corporate NGOs, started strategizing the development of Mumbai into an International 
Finance Centre. During this time several consultancy reports where churned out: the 
most significant one titled the “Vision Mumbai” report was prepared by McKinsey 
consultants in 2003, while another being the Export-Import Bank of India report 
prepared in 2000, and the third one was the High Powered Expert Committee Report of 
the Indian Government’s Ministry of Finance brought out in 2007. The focus of all these 
reports was to strategize the development of Mumbai into an International Financial 
Centre. 
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11 A Central Government Committee -Banerjee Committee in 1974 recommended shift of wholesale markets to BKC 
which ultimately did not materialize.  
12 “Economic liberalization” refers to market oriented reforms which saw the opening up of various sectors like 
agriculture, manufacturing and services to domestic and foreign private investment.  
 Mumbai’s global status was reinforced by the creation of Bombay-First in 1995, 
an NGO think-tank directly modeled after U.K.’s London-First.  It was the first Mumbai 
think-tank to formulate initiatives to improve the city’s receptivity to inward investment. 
Bombay First commissioned the “Vision Mumbai” report from the American 
management consultants McKinsey in 2003. It discussed the ways in which Mumbai 
could become more like Shanghai (Harris 2008). This document provided the blueprint 
for Mumbai’s overall development for the next ten years (Mohan 2005), and it also 
called for economic growth and a rapid improvement in city life (Bombay First-McKinsey 
2003). According to the report an investment of 40 billion rupees will be required to 
convert the megacity into world-class cities. For this to be achieved, the report 
benchmarked other global cities like New York, Singapore and Hongkong and stated 
that Mumbai ought to convert into a “world-class city” by 2013.13  It outlined an 
abundance of measures to do it. It also stated that, like the development of BKC, 
Nariman Point, Andheri-Kurla and Vashi, a poly-nucleated CBD development would be 
required (Bombay First-McKinsey 2003). It repeatedly made mention of BKC as the site 
of a Regional Finance Centre first and an offshore Banking Unit subsequently. The 
report also mentioned that the commercial sector BKC must extend to Dharavi. 
 Therefore through the commission of the “Vision Mumbai” and other corporate 
reports we see a change in urban governance with the deployment of an increased 
number of players outside the sphere of the state. This translated into a multiplicity of 
modes of interaction with the state (Ruet 2009). There is a now a growing role of 
corporate actors and multilateral agencies in policy making, particularly through their 
intervention as an assertive interest group or even as consultants. Corporate NGOs 
now work closely with the government in solving urban problems and setting the urban 
agenda. This constitutes an alliance of the state and central governments with 
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13 See Sudha Mohan, ‘The Megacity of Multiple Humanscape’ in Urban development and New Localism- Urban 
Politics in Mumbai. Rawat Publications, (2005), 104.  
business-class elite and experts, resulting in the reshaping of policies concerning the 
city of Mumbai and its suburbs (Ghosh et al.  2009). In this sense, there is now a 
corporatization of planning and a simultaneous withdrawal of the state. World-wide 
market-oriented reforms are promoted in areas of urban service delivery and housing 
along with an analysis of policy failures of the public sector programmes (NCAER, 1996 
quoted in Kennedy and Zerah 2008).
 In this regard, Harvey (1989) points out the nature of change in urban 
governance in late capitalism from “Managerialism” of the 60s to the present decade. 
He describes a shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism in urban governance. 
The managerial approach of the 1960s had given way to the entrepreneurial forms of 
action of the 1970s and 80s. He contends that the capitalist development has now 
moved from a “Fordist” regime to one of “Flexible Accumulations.”14  In the “fordist 
regime,” the goal of the state was welfare and the scale and economy “national.”15 In 
entrepreneurialism, by contrast, the centerpiece notion is public-private partnership with 
the destabilization of past hierarchies of scale (Brenner and Theodore 2002). There is 
an increasing focus on building the image of the city into an entrepreneurial one with 
speculative projects being granted. The upgrading of the image of a particular place is 
accomplished through the construction of office centers and entertainment centers 
which can cast a beneficial shadow over the whole metropolitan region.
Field Studies Carried Out Among the Marginalized Communities at BKC 
I undertook a field study in BKC and Dharavi to understand the consequences of this 
corporatization of planning and its impact on the communities staying there. Close to 
the International Finance and Business Centre at BKC is Bharatnagar, a transit camp 
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14David Harvey,“Managerialism to Entrepreneuralism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism,” 
Geografiska Annaler, 71 B (1), (1989): 3-17.
15 See Bob Jessop, 1999 and Swyngedouw, 1997 in Brenner and Theodore, (2002): 364-66
built by the state agency MHADA in 1975 on the banks of the Vakola Nala (Figure 5). 16 
Slum dwellers who were occupying lands at the time of construction of a highway 
project in west Bandra were shifted to this land in Bharatnagar as part of the Slum 
Clearance Redevelopment and Rehabilitation Scheme. Furthermore, the state 
government (Maharashtra Housing Board) has denoted this area as the transit camp 
land. This transit camp has twelve plots in the locality. People here are supposed to be 
in ‘transit’ or in temporary dwellings, but they have resided in this area for more than 35 
years. Therefore, by Government Regulation, if a person or possessor of the property 
has stayed on a plot owned by the government for more than 30 years and the owner, 
or in this case the government, has not taken legal steps to recover the possession, the 
property by default goes to the possessor by the Law of adverse Possession (Patel 
2010). In other words, the community has become the legal owners of the property. 
However, the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (MMRDA), in 
charge of overall development of this area, has decided to relocate four thousand slum-
dwelling families out of BKC in an ambitious Rs.3000 crore ($680 million) plan to 
relocate the slum elsewhere so as to make BKC home to upscale international standard 
office complexes, five-star hotels, hospitals, a convention centre, mini golf course and a 
drive-in-theatre with entertainment complex. Talks are underway to develop this area 
into a commercial and retail hub spread over forty-eight acres. Gujarat-based Adani 
Exports Ltd. with its partners, the Housing Development Infrastructure Limited (HDIL), 
has entered into a Rs.2250 crore deal with the state to set up commercial complexes, 
retail areas, multiplexes, hotels and service apartments over the next couple of years. 
Hence, builders have set their eyes in this area and are coaxing communities to give up 
their lands in lieu of huge sums of money (Figure 6). Following Smith (2002), then, we 
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16 Maharahtra Housing and Area Development Authority which is the government agency involved with Slum 
Rehabilitation and Redevelopment in the city. It is the agency which also constructs free-housing for the slum 
dwellers in the city.  
can say that “a new amalgam of corporate and state powers have been forged in more 
ambitious efforts to gentrify cities, and it is greater than the scale of urban renewal done 
with public financing. It is a class-inflected urban remake, taking the city from the poor to 
the middle classes.”17 Smith argues that “the new authoritarianism of the state quashes 
opposition and makes the streets safe for gentrification resulting in a “‘revanchist” 
city.”18  Hence, the corporatization of planning with the backing of the state is today 
resulting in large scale gentrification.
People’s Protest and Legal Intervention – A Case Study of Valmiki Nagar in Bharat 
Nagar, BKC
Though faced with evictions, the poor people have not given up their rights and some 
are even fighting a legal battle, as in the case of the Dalits in the BKC area. These lower 
caste people who work as cleaners and sweepers in the city have laid claim to their 
rights over the land and say that the government cannot erase their existence by 
profiteering through development. Empowered by the 74th Constitutional Amendment 
Act, community leaders (who are residents of the area and participate actively in 
decision making concerning their own neighborhood issues), have come to the forefront 
in their struggle for the rights over their property and homes. 19  As one-third of the 
hutments were razed to the ground in November 2008, people approached the police, 
sent letters to politicians, and then appealed to the High Court that their dwellings were 
made as part of the Valmiki Ambedgar Yojna – a central government programme for the 
poor and the marginalized. This proved that their dwellings were legal. Subsequently, a 
high powered committee consisting of the state government heads of department was 
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17 Neil Smith, “New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrifying as Global Strategy,” Antipode, 34, (2002), 443 
18 Ibid., 442.
19 The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act was introduced in 1992. It is a system of local urban governance where 
municipal service delivery decisions are taken by constituting ward committees whose members  may comprise of 
civil society groups, community leaders of the locality, state and corporate representatives. 
appointed to check their legal status. The High Court then gave a stay order towards 
any further demolitions, deciding to construct a platform over the river and rehabilitate 
them on site. Yet the situation here is still very volatile as builders are coaxing the poor 
to vacate their land and houses so that they can start redeveloping the plot and cash in 
on the free-sale component of slum redevelopment projects.20  The builders are also 
creating fractions among the communities as the poorest of the lot, who are in need of 
money vacate their plots thinking that it is the best deal meted out to them by builders, 
while others are trying to retain the land and house, as confusion reigns in the 
neighborhood.  
Formation of Cooperative Society and Self Development Solutions to Housing Problems 
In yet another neighborhood of the same locality, the residents have banded together 
for self-development by designing their own housing solutions without waiting for 
builders and developers to encroach upon their homes. About 160 families here have 
resisted the builders and have come together to form a cooperative society (Figure 7). 
They obtained ownership rights to the land through the Transfer of Ownership Law of 
the state housing department (Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority). 
This law allows tenants to claim ownership from the original owners if the tenants, forma 
cooperative society that pays back the original owners a sum equivalent to 100 times 
the rent as compensation to the authority (BMRDA, 1995).21  In official parlance, this is 
referred to as the “conveyance of the plot,” that is, the legal transfer of property from the 
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20 Under the Slum Redevelopment Project a builder is supposed to provide free apartment blocks to original slum 
dwellers and is rewarded with an equal amount or more FSI for sale at market rates to new buyers who cross-
subsidize free apartments for slum dwellers. The additional FSI for cross-subsidization was to the tune of 1:0.75 in 
the island city, 1:1 in the suburbs and 1:1.33 in Dharavi. For e.g. if the builder or developer undertakes slum 
construction of 10,000 sq.ft he would be able to sell an additional 10,000 at market rates in the suburbs or 7,500 sq.ft 
in the island city or 13,300 sq. ft. in Dharavi.
21 BMRDA (1995): Draft Regional Plan for Bombay Metropolitan Region, 1996-2011 
original owner (which in this case is Maharashtra Housing Board) to the members of the 
tenants’ cooperative society.22 
  The residents then approached Federation for Tenants Association, a Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO), in search of housing solutions. This NGO, 
comprised of architects, planners and lawyers, drafted design plans and offered 
consultancy services free of cost to them. Hence the community has become the builder 
by forming a cooperative society. The lawyers associated with the NGO handle legal 
issues; the architects provide the building plan and prepare the layout; and residents 
pool their money for construction. The community has the housing designed and 
constructed, getting benefitted themselves from taking the free-sale component which 
would have otherwise gone to the builder.23  They also decide how much FSI to sell in 
the open market in order to cover the costs of construction, create a corpus for 
maintenance, and make a small profit. Therefore the profit goes to the community, and 
in this way the NGO not only creates building designs and layout or floor plans 
according to their choice but also receives an FSI not limited to 225 square feet as they 
themselves then decide how much profits they want to make in the free-sale component 
and can therefore sell a lower FSI in the market.
Dharavi Redevelopment Plan: People’s Network Building and Activism Against State 
Gentrification Plans
The second field study was carried out at Dharavi which lies at the periphery of BKC 
and has come under the threat of another urban regeneration plan of the state. Dharavi- 
Asia’s biggest slum with a population anywhere between 700,000 and 1.2 million, has 
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22 Letter addressed to the Estate Manager, Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Board from the people of 
the Paradise Cooperative Housing Society details this issue. 
23 Refer to Slum Redevelopment Project above.
become prime property as it is situated very close to BKC.24 Originally developed on a 
marshland it is situated today in the midst of two major railway lines (Patel and 
Arputham 2007). The real estate prices at BKC have skyrocketed in the last decade 
from Rs. 1,10,000/sq m in 1995 to Rs. 3,00,000/sq.m in the present times. Hence the 
state government has decided to take up the Dharavi lands for redevelopment and free 
up space for commercial development. Mukhija (2002) argues that the slum 
redevelopment strategy in Mumbai has evolved in response to extremely high property 
values in the city. Today, the entire area of Dharavi is threatened by the 15,000 crore ($ 
3.3 billion) Slum Redevelopment Scheme of the government. This project was designed 
by the developer Mukesh Mehta of MM Consultants and presented to the government in 
2003.25  The metropolitan government had plans to redevelop Dharavi by offering 
building rights to private developers in exchange for the construction of housing for slum 
dwellers who have resided there prior to the cut-off date January 2000, (a policy for 
legalizing slum dwellers), as per  the provisions of the Slum Redevelopment Scheme. 
The project is officially known as the ‘Dharavi Redevelopment Project’ (DRP). The 
Dharavi Redevelopment Project aims at rehabilitating eligible households and 
establishments and creating additional residential or commercial space for sale in the 
open market by allowing a FSI of 4 on the site itself.  The Slum Redevelopment Scheme 
involves the demolition of existing slums and their subsequent redevelopment at a 
higher density. This provides market rate housing to new buyers which cross-subsidizes 
free apartment blocks for original slum dwellers. This involves a change in the land 
redevelopment regulations in order to allow for the increased intensity and density of 
redevelopment in the city’s slums (Mukhija 2002).   
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24 For Dharavi’s population see Roma Chatterjee, “Plans, habitation and slum redevelopment: The production of 
community in Dharavi, Mumbai,” Contributions to Indian Sociology; (2005), 199. http://cis.sagepub.com/cgi/content/
abstract/39/2/197 
25 http://www.dharavi.org/F._Press/A.2009/Reprievefor_Dharavi
 The Dharavi Slum Redevelopment Project tells the story of how common people 
forge national and international alliances with civil society groups, academics, and the 
media to resist development which is being thrust upon them by the state. Dharavi is a 
223 hectare informal settlement situated very close to Bandra-Kurla Complex in the 
heart of Greater Mumbai. Over the years it has seen a regular flow of migrants from all 
parts of India, including Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal etc. For the 
purpose of redevelopment, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority appointed the Pune-based 
NGO Mashal (Maharashtra Social Housing and Action League) to carry out a survey of 
Dharavi. The survey noted that about 25,000 families live in the upper floors in two or 
three storey structures, but since the civic authorities consider only ground floor 
structures as eligible for redevelopment, these families will remain out of the 
redevelopment process (Bharucha Nauzer, 2009). The Dharavi Redevelopment Project 
has been loudly decried as undemocratic by academics, civil society groups, and the 
residents themselves, as it leaves the locals completely outside the decision-making 
process. A committee of experts comprised of academics, independent researchers and 
representatives of  the NGO, SPARC, have raised objections to the draft DRP and have 
sent a letter to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra saying that it is a primarily a land-grab 
project for profit making. 26  The letter says that the residents from different parts of the 
city and country have been made to settle there by the Government, without granting 
them proper legal rights of occupancy. Although they were lawfully entitled to a lease for 
the period of ninety-nine years, land rights have been denied to them. In Dharavi, they 
have established not just their homes but thriving businesses (e.g. leather tanning, 
pottery, papad making, and tailoring). It is the proximity of their residences to these 
workplaces that has made their businesses efficient and competitive. Dharavi consists 
of small informal workshops which typically comprise 5-6 workers living and working 
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26 SPARC: Society for the Promotion of Area Resources Centre a Mumbai-based grassroots NGO working with the 
slum and pavement dwellers of the city.  
together under one tin roof. The present plan for redeveloping Dharavi makes no 
provision to factor in this residence-workplace typology. They contend that the residents 
of Dharavi are being offered free reconstruction and the legalization of their status, but 
this is in exchange for shifting into 47% of their original land area and the destruction of 
their livelihoods. They have appealed to the government to focus on the interests of the 
residents rather than profits. Therefore the residents should be encouraged to 
redevelop their own neighborhood, locality by locality as they feel it is necessary to do 
so. (http://www.dharavi.org/Dharavi_Advocacy/I._Government_Documents/
DRP_Letter_by_Commitee_of_Experts). The residents of Dharavi have in fact formed 
alliances with various Mumbai-based NGOs like Concerned Citizens for Dharavi 
(chaired by Mr. Sukhtankar, a retired Chief Secretary to the Government of 
Maharashtra), the Dharavi Vikas Samitee (a federation of cooperatives and business 
leaders) as well as other NGOs like the Society for the Promotion of Area Resources 
Centre, Mahila Milan, and National Slum Dwellers Federation. The Dharavi Bachao 
Andolan or Save Dharavi Movement is a coalition of different sets of associations, 
cooperatives and networks who came together to protest against the government plan 
to redevelop Dharavi. Moreover, people have demonstrated their opposition from the 
beginning of the redevelopment plan, but in June 2007 the people’s protest reached the 
streets when the government failed to act. Citizens held a black flag march from Dharavi 
to the MHADA office, the authority responsible for Dharavi Redevelopment, as a mark 
of protest and solidarity. (http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=5tE1gF4eZ5M) (Figure 8). The 
Dharavi Vikas Samitee alleged that the government did not perform any proper survey 
of the population which had a manifold increase from the date of the last survey carried 
out during the launch of Prime Ministers Grant Programme. The earlier survey 
enumerated that there were around fifty-thousand structures. Even though slum 
redevelopment programs require that 70% of the community participate in reaching a 
decision the government has not met this basic requirement. The draft plan has also 
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gone unpublished and objections and suggestions have not been invited by the 
government. With these objections, the Samitee along with renowned academic Arjun 
Appadurai, ex-Chief Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra D.M Sukthankar, 
along with other distinguished urban planners including Shirish Patel, sent a letter to the 
Prime Minister on the May 9th, 2007 requesting that he review and reconsider the 
development plan. After a series of letters and protest movements, the government 
started acting and reassessment of the plan was undertaken by the Chief of MHADA 
wherein he convened a meeting with the residents of Dharavi and heard their pleas 
(Patel & Arputham 2008). However, the journalist, Kalpana Sharma, writes that “the 
October 2009 elections provided relief for the Dharavi residents as the project came to a 
grinding halt on account of the fact that no political party wanted to lose its vote bank by 
going ahead with a plan which would go against resident interests.”27  She made a 
statement that “Dharavi was a thriving and functioning urban settlement and not a slum 
that needs to be flattened and rebuilt.”28  She remarked that the plan had been 
developed without the solid study of Dharavi’s physical, demographic, economic, and 
social character.29
 A workshop was held in one of the oldest neighborhoods of Dharavi, the 
Koliwada, in March 2008 wherein a few personal interviews were carried out with the 
residents in order to understand the nature of the protest they were launching and their 
negotiation process with the government.30  Today Koliwada, a gaothan (meaning a 
village settlement) in Dharavi comprising of about 2500 families, is at the forefront of the 
battle for claiming the right to develop their neighborhood on their own terms. The 
residents of Koliwada have sought help from architects, planners, activists, sociologists, 
academics and students from all over the world who can offer solutions for the future of 
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28 http://www.dharavi.org
29 http://www.dharavi.org
30 Urban Typhoon Workshop held in Dharavi from 16th to 22nd March 2008
their neighborhood and community by organizing a workshop in their area.31  The 
purpose of this workshop was to detail the problems of the slum redevelopment scheme 
and to offer solutions for redeveloping the neighborhood through people’s participation. 
The Urban Typhoon Workshop had several teams working under one platform to map 
the gaothan, including public and social spaces, while some became involved in 
rediscovering Kol iwada through the spaces used by chi ldren. (http:/ /
www.urbantyphoon.com/context.htm). The academics and students who came from all 
over the world from reputed institutions were engaged in designing an alternative 
redevelopment plan. After an intensive study of the area and the neighborhood they 
were able to come up with a redevelopment plan that would incorporate the live-work 
typology for the people of Dharavi. Additionally, community leaders in Koliwada are 
fighting to save their neighborhood from the government redevelopment scheme. They 
confer that the tamrapatra (land titles) of Koliwada given to the Kolis by the British show 
that the land originally belonged jointly to the fisher folk community and that the 
government had no right to take it away from them in lieu of a 225 sq. ft. of free housing. 
Koliwada is approximately 40,000 sq.m area with a population of about 15,000. The 
Kolis first settled in Dharavi when the fish population of Mahim creek was abundant. 
The British government gave a lease to the Kolis for fishing in the 1940s, according to 
Ravi Keny, a resident and a community leader. Those times are now gone and since 
the 1950s a busy road replaces the shore (www.dharavi.org/koliwada). 
 The first reclamation of the marshlands for the construction of Dharavi took place 
in 1812. (Kamla Raheja Vidyanidhi Institute of Architecture, 2007). The second 
reclamation of part of the creek occurred around 1966.32 Since then, fishing activity has 
ceased. In the later part of 1960s, illegal liquor businesses started, requiring a great 
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31 Urban Typhoon Workshop was organized from the 16th-22nd  March  2008, by PUKAR (Partners for Knowledge 
Urban Action and Research), an NGO based in Mumbai and working on urban issues.
32 Personal Communication with community leader Ravi Keny at the Urban Typhoon Workshop, 16th March 2008.
deal of water for production.33 However, the cessation of fishing activity was mainly due 
to pollution of the river with the discharge of effluents from informal industries located in 
Kurla and elsewhere. The construction of the airport and blockage of the flow of water 
were additional factors. After the government labeled the liquor trade as an illegal 
activity, people slowly began looking for alternative sources of income. They devised a 
strategy wherein they made additions over their earlier dwelling structures and sought 
income through renting out their houses. While a small proportion of the people work for 
the government,, a majority earn their livelihood by renting out their spaces (Figure 9). 
The average monthly rents range between Rs.3000-4000 per tenement. Therefore the 
residents say that it is important to have a thorough understanding of the livelihood 
patterns before any redevelopment is carried out. They regret the fact that the plight of 
Koliwada in Dharavi has been strongly affected by the civic administration’s inability to 
understand its village-like structure. The Dharavi redevelopment scheme is a sectoral 
scheme which attempts to give tracts of land to real estate agents and disregards the 
fact that Dharavi is comprised of ‘nagars’ and not sectors (Patel & Arputham, 2008). 
Hence, the people of Dharavi have not let the state decide their fate and have not 
allowed the state to move forward with the SRA free-housing scheme of 225 square 
feet. Ravi Keny and Bhau Korde, residents and community leaders of Koliwada say that 
the government redevelopment project will stack them up into high rises and will destroy 
the community feeling and sharing of common spaces including religious places 
playgrounds, and porches where people sit to relax after a day’s work. Bhau Korde 
says: “it is important to see each other and hence I insist on keeping doors open and 
would prefer a chawl set up with long corridors where people can regularly interact.”34 
He says that “activities like papad making require the women folk to work collectively in 
Sutapa Ghosh
22
33 Talk by Jokin Arputtam, head of the NGO National Slum dwellers Federation at the Urban Typhoon Workshop, 16th 
March, 2008 
34 Personal Communication with Bhau Korde on 21st March 2008
courtyards.” (Figure 10). Thus the government should treat Dharavi not only as places 
of residence but as places which have livelihoods attached to them. However, the 
people’s continued protest brought themselves and the government’s plan to the notice 
of the national and international community. Furthermore, the support from NGOs have 
helped the Kolis to get Koliwada excluded from the Dharavi Redevelopment Plan as of 
April 2008 after a series of protests, media reports, court cases and hearings. Koliwada 
today has a legal status – it has become a property of the Jamat Trust comprising of the 
Kolis of Koliwada.  
Conclusion
From the illustrations above we can say that the people’s resistance and people-centred 
decision-making play a role in shaping and reshaping the urban built environment as 
communities resisted class cleansing over space. Following Partha Chatterjee’s (2002) 
concept of “political society,” we can say that it is not only the civil society but the entire 
community representing the “political society” who actively engage in the decision-
making process to usher in or resist changes to the built environment.35  We can also 
say that the state is withdrawing from the consumption or housing sphere as it seeks 
private-public partnerships in housing the poor as the Dharavi Redevelopment Plan 
demonstrates. This is also evident in Bharatnagar where builders are approaching 
people to vacate their plots. Communities are becoming divided as the state gentrifies 
neighborhoods, but there is also a fierce struggle from the communities themselves in 
Dharavi and Bharatnagar as they remain united in their resistance of gentrification while 
claiming the rights to their living and work space. This is where social capital and the 
people's ability to build networks to strengthen their fight against class cleansing in 
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35 See Chatterjee (1997) where he considers it as a ‘democratic form of modern institution’ and different from the 
‘civil’ society. It is supposed to represent the entire population and is meant to be inclusive of the entire community- 
their political movements, the power structures etc. based on the notion of the welfare state. 
space in observed. Therefore, urban planning calls for an understanding of not only the 
state and its relation to capital but also of how communities affect public decisions and 
the urban built form. 
Figures
 
Source: Pacione, M. Cities, Elsevier Ltd. vol 23, (3) (2005): 229-238
Figure 1: Location map of Mumbai showing Bombay City and Salsette Islands as well as the 
entire Mumbai Metropolitan Region
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Figure 2: Location of Bandra Kurla Complex and the wholesale market which is located in the 
island city of Mumbai
Figure 3: Banks and other financial sector offices at BKC
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Figure 4: Hotels and Convention Centre at BKC 
Figure 5: Bharatnagar Transit Tenements at BKC
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Figure 6: Bharatnagar slum at BKC to be cleared to make way for a commercial and retail hub: 
Builders coax residents to vacate homes for money
Figure 7: Self Development : People signing papers to form a cooperative society in one of the 
localities at Bharatnagar, BKC
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Figure 8: People taking out black flag marches in protest of the state plan to redevelop Dharavi 
Figure 9: Fish market at Koliwada. Kolis have made additions to their structures and are now 
renting out their top floor rooms.
Figure 10: Papad-making required women to work collectively in common-open spaces or 
courtyards: Dharavi’s typical live-work typology.
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Sealing the Script, Concealing the Image: The 
Ramifications of Representation in the Indus Civilization
by Michael Brattus Jones
 “The most curious object discovered at Harapâ is a seal, belonging to Major Clark, which was 
found along with two small objects like chess pawns, made of dark brown jasper. All these are 
shewn in the accompanying plate. The seal is smooth black stone without polish. On it is 
engraved very deeply a bull, without hump, looking to the right, with two stars under the neck. 
Above the bull there is an inscription in six characters, which are quite unknown to me. They are 
certainly not Indian letters; and as the bull which accompanies them is without a hump, I 
conclude that the seal is foreign to India.”
- Alexander Cunningham’s mention and representation of the first seal discovered in 1872 
(Cunningham 1875, 108, Plate 33 A.)
The attribution of the status of “script” has recently been challenged for what is 
otherwise known as the “Indus script.” For over a century, since before even the 
archaeological discovery of the associated Indus Valley or Harappan Civilization, the 
signs or symbols they produced, most often on tiny steatite seals, have been interpreted 
as “script.” This “script” has become renowned as one of the most mysterious, 
34
challenging, and important undeciphered scripts of the ancient world. The article “The 
Collapse of the Indus Script Thesis” (Farmer, Sproat and Witzel 2004), has effectively 
called into question such an attribution of script as an unexamined assumption, 
although the article’s further claim to have disproved such an attribution has several 
crippling flaws. This paper seeks to examine how the presumption of script and the 
preference for text has conditioned the use and manipulation of image in studying the 
Indus Civilization, as well as to explicate how certain ideological and methodological 
biases have pervaded and contextualized the study of the “script” and the civilization of 
the ancient Indus. 
 The first discovery of a seal containing the “script” actually predated the 
discovery of its context, the Indus Civilization. Alexander Cunningham, widely known as 
the “father of Indian archaeology” though practicing a rudimentary, even crude, sort of 
proto-archaeology, found a seal1 as he was exploring Buddhist stupas in the Northwest 
India in the 1870s (Cunningham 1875). The initial interpretation of the signs or symbols 
on the seal as a hitherto unknown “script” indeed traces back to its first impression upon 
modern times. The culture productive of the seal, the Indus, or Harappan, Civilization 
was not likewise discovered by archaeology until the 1920s, leaving the seal and its 
“script” uncontextualized for a significant period of time (Possehl 1996, 16). With the 
excavations of the first and primary sites of the civilization, Harappa and Mohenjo-daro, 
coinciding with the excavations of the roughly contemporaneous civilizations of Egypt 
and Mesopotamia, which were both literate, the presumption of script status for the 
Indus signs went unchallenged as fitting the emerging pattern of early (even initial) 
urbanization that was riverine, agricultural, and literate. 
 The various use of image in the analysis of these signs or symbols takes on 
distinct qualities in association with methodologies that seek to recognize and interpret 
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1 Cunningham’s report ambiguously describes the find as “belonging to Major Clark”; it was Cunningham’s report and 
site.
script. This usage of image includes photographs, certain manipulations of photographs, 
as well as hand-drawn and computer-drawn representations of images and of 
photographs, yielding a spectrum of staggering representation of representation. Each 
step of representation entails potentials for manipulation that are susceptible to 
preference, selection, and bias, according to the often overlapping factors of ideology, 
methodology, and supposition. 
 The history of the study of this “script” bears this out explicitly; the most extreme 
case, a fraudulent and intentionally constructed image of a “horse seal,” is inextricably 
linked with a revisionist history corresponding to nationalist and fundamentalist ideology 
(Witzel and Farmer 2000). Less egregious but still disturbing are the cases of 
comparative sleight-of-hand wherein constructed representation of a source-image is 
compared with another constructed representation, rather than source-image directly 
with source-image. Presupposing an unproblematic, “pure,” objectivity for photography 
is untenable considering its inherent conditioning and subsequent interpretation by 
human agency; however, a “relative objectivity” of photography would seem to suggest 
itself in comparison to the selection, abstraction, constructed uniformity, and contrived 
presentation of drawing abstract symbols that, for analysis and therefore in reality, are 
the ideal forms of an apparently similar character in both the Indus script and Egyptian 
hieroglyphics, or Brahmi, or Rapanui. A great deal of this is attributable to the modality 
of  “script” as opposed to “image.”
 The extent to which this distinction between script and image is apparent has 
continuously been presumed and selected, even in the Farmer, Sproat, and Witzel 
(2004) article that challenges the attribution of “script” to the signs composing the 
image. The methodological stakes are high; script and image entail quite distinct 
modalities of analysis and interpretation. Scripts are analyzed by epigraphy and 
paleography, and compose texts, which are analyzed by textual scholarship, and which 
are (overwhelming) composed of language, analyzed linguistically. The analysis of 
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image, on the hand, overlaps archaeology in cases such as this, but is the special 
purview of art history. 
 The question of the differentiation of script and image is perhaps more crucial for 
the Indus script than for other undeciphered scripts because the most common 
occurrence of the Indus script is in isolated juxtaposition to a (most frequently) larger, 
more detailed, less abstract, figure of an animal. The “unicorn seal” is the by far most 
frequent. The second register of images, which is typically smaller, arranged equitably, 
and contains “abstract” figures, is analyzed as “the script” (Wheeler 1966, 38-40). 
 The pervasive ubiquity of the distinction is betrayed by the failure to account for 
the juxtaposition of the “script” to the animal figure even in the Farmer, Sproat and 
Witzel article (2004). It likewise takes for granted an inherent differentiation of the two 
registers, which is problematic in that case because the non-linguistic functionality 
ascribed to the “non-script” as narrative and mythological would seem to apply equally 
to the more concrete animal figures. It fails to account for the two levels of abstraction in 
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The article “The collapse of the Indus-
script thesis: The myth of a literate 
Harappan civilization.” (Farmer, Sproat 
and Witzel 2004) depicts critically 
Iravatham Mahadevan’s abstraction and 
standardization of script from image in 
The Indus script: texts, concordance, and 
tables (1977), despite following the same 
process for a quantitative analysis of the 
signs.
the register, despite its use of representation in selecting only the “script” level for 
quantitative analysis.  
 The differentiation seems justified on the basis of the abstract quality of the 
“script” as opposed to the figure. The script contains signs that appear completely 
abstract along with signs that seem pictographic. It is according to the understanding of 
what a script is, or what types of script are known, that necessitates taking the spectrum 
of signs from the abstract to the pictographic together under the umbrella of “script” (or 
“non-script”) signs. Yet, when the spectrum is explicitly recognized, and when the 
modality of script is challenged, the assumed obvious distinction between the two 
registers recedes and placing a dividing line between the more pictographic signs of the 
script and the detailed figures of the animals becomes problematic. 
 The extrication of script from image, and the constructed re-representation of the 
signs of the script trace back to the earliest decipherment attempts in the 1920s and 
1930s. It is also at this time that there coalesces interpretation and ideology. Indeed, 
many of the intellectual currents of those times were mired in imperialistic ideology that 
entailed notions of race, language and identity which were yet uninformed by the 
rational inquiries of disciplines still looming on the horizon, such as genetics, 
anthropology and cultural studies. The conflation of the notions of language, ethnicity 
and nation in the construction of race specifically qualified assumptions about 
prehistory. The work of V. Gordon Childe, an influential prehistorian of the time, 
explicitly connected the Indo-European languages and inherent dominance of social 
hierarchy into the concept of the white “Aryan” master-race (Possehl, 1996 17). L. E. 
Waddell applied this framework to the study of the Indus script. He referred to the script 
as “the Indo-Sumerian script” (Waddell 1926, 115) and, working back and forth between 
the Sumerian language, the Sanskrit language, and similarities between the ancient 
scripts used to write these languages, constructed a prehistory that grounded European 
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imperialism in the dominance of two of the three significant early urbanizations, Sumer 
(Mesopotamia) and the Indus Civilization, by the (white) Aryan race. 
 While throughout the early period of decipherment attempts, that the “script” be 
selected, abstracted, constructed and represented was not questioned, how precisely 
these steps (mostly implicitly) were to carried out was problematic and marked the 
multiplicitous divergence of approaches to the analysis of the script. The result is 
apparent today with over a thousand publications devoted to the Indus script, over a 
hundred of which are decipherment attempts (Possehl 1996, 1-2). According to the 
Farmer, Sproat and Witzel article, the various sign counts for the script range between 
20 and 600 distinct signs. Yet it goes unrecognized that this significantly undermines the 
results of the quantitative analysis of that article itself, as well as similar attempts; it only 
represents the results of one possible method of selecting distinct units. Furthermore, 
such selection and construction of abstract signs is a priori absurd if the “more abstract 
of the two registers” does not constitute a script.
 The catch of how exactly to parse the script from image prevailed throughout 
early decipherment attempts. Waddell’s putative connection between Mesopotamia and 
the Indus Valley would prompt a response from George Barton, a prominent 
Assyrologist of the time. His article “On the So-Called Sumero-Indian Seals” (1926) 
utilized a comparative methodology to refute Waddell’s conclusions. This entailed the 
process of abstraction and construction of the script in comparison with other ancient 
languages and scripts: “The comparison was then made naturally enlarged to include 
also Elamitic, Egyptian, Cretan, and Cypriote, as well as Sumerian, Hittite and Chinese. 
… Up to the present time the writer [Barton] has studied seventy-two inscriptions, and 
has from them prepared a sign list of 124 different signs not counting 51, which are 
some of them certainly, and others probably, mere variant forms.” (Barton 1926, 82). 
Despite recognizing some problematics with the construction of the “sign list,” Barton 
did not hesitate in using his “signs” as any scholar might utilize ancient scripts or special 
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graphemes – with the direct insertion into lines of scholarly English prose, such as ☸, 
π , æ, ©, ∞. 
Insertion of Conventionalized “Signs” into Text. (Barton 1926, 84)
 While such practice is eminently rational and desirable for scripts of known 
quantity, it is more problematic for undeciphered scripts, but for “signs,” images, to 
which the ascription of “script” is itself challenged, the potential of the implications to 
mislead must give serious pause. The same must be said for the corollary practice of 
inserting the constructed sign list into charts demonstrating variation or comparison, 
which, for the sake of convenience, continues to be a format of presentation for the 
signs and inscriptions in standard works of scholarly reference, such as Iravatham 
Mahadevan’s highly praised volume The Indus Script: Texts, Concordance and Tables, 
published by the Archaeological Survey of India in 1977. It is in this format that all the 
inscriptions (texts) known at that time were published, using a sign list entirely bereft of 
the possibly relevant image context, such as the extremely frequent juxtaposition to the 
larger and more detailed animal figures on the seals.  
 Aside from (constructed) sign insertion into text and into chart, another common 
form of representation of the script is line drawing representing the entire “inscribed” 
seal or artifact. This can be envisioned as one step removed from the “relative 
objectivity” of photographs in that the representation does not select and abstract the 
script signs out from among the image context. This format of representation coincides 
with the archaeological practice of representing artifacts with line drawing. Photography 
is also used to represent the image upon the seals and inscribed artifacts. The most 
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prevalent dissonance between the source image and its photographic representation 
concerns scale; in contrast to the frequent effect of photography in making large small, 
photos of Indus seals typically enlarge the image. The vast majority of the inscribed 
seals are remarkably tiny, a couple of centimeters square. While indeed much clearer to 
view and interpret, the enlarged photographs unfortunately minimize the feats of 
prodigious skill entailed in detailing the minutely miniscule. The trade-off required for the 
transaction of communicative representation may be worthwhile, but is still a trade-off. 
Both photography and script decipherment are special instances in the epistemology of 
representation. As such, the selection of what is to be represented, or to be constructed 
in representation, is an epistemological sticking point, a detraction from objectivity, that 
seems to leave the status of representation theoretically groundless. 
Seal Representation (Barton 1926, 90)
Photographic Representation of Seal Impression (Barton 1925, 95)
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 The danger of the manipulation and distortion of photographic representation is 
most clear in the case of a fraudulent depiction of a horse image on a seal. The aspect 
of horse is especially significant in marking the case as an ideologically motivated act of 
revisionist history in accordance with fundamentalist and nationalist concerns; the horse 
is considered one of the critical markers of Indo-European presence and its complete 
absence from the archaeological record of the Indus Civilization is one of the primary 
incompatibilities of associating the Indus Civilization with the Vedic peoples. This was 
precisely the agenda of N.S. Rajaram and Dr. Natwar Jha in their decipherment attempt 
The Deciphered Indus Script (1999), in which they claim that the Indus script represents 
nothing less that Late Vedic Sanskrit. The principle debunking occurred in a mainstream 
Indian news magazine, Frontline, in an article entitled “Horseplay in Harappa” by 
Michael Witzel and Steve Farmer (2000), two of the authors of “Collapse of the Indus 
Script thesis” (2004). Indicating the ideological motivation, they quote Rajaram, a former 
engineering professor and Hindutva propagandist: “All Indian history, Rajaram writes, 
can be pictured as a struggle between nationalistic and imperialistic forces” (Witzel 
2000, 5). This makes awkward the notion of an inward migration of Indo-European 
speaking people from outside of India, especially the very Vedic tribes recognized as 
the forefathers of Hinduism and therefore Indian cultural identity. The solution of 
“indigenous Aryans” preempts a significant portion of Hindu identity from association 
with “outsiders” and at the same time secures the birthright of venerable antiquity 
through the continuity of Indian identity throughout millennia. 
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Rajaram and Jha’s Presentation of the Horse Seal (after Witzel and Farmer 2000)
 The image of the horse was the result of the computer manipulation of a unicorn 
sealing that was broken and missing half, the half with the head of the animal. The 
misrepresentation of a sealing, a seal-impression, as the seal itself, indicated the 
pervasiveness of the distortion, although it also eventually allowed the sealing that was 
source of the distorted image to be matched to the seal that produced it, thereby 
confirming the identity of the animal as the common unicorn figure. The distorted image 
was published in the decipherment attempt alongside an artist’s line-drawing 
representation of the seal complete with a clearly drawn horse, bringing the situation to 
a state of utter absurdity. Rajaram both failed to mention the break and failed to properly 
cite the source of the image (Witzel and Farmer 2000). 
 Witzel and Farmer reported that only through seemingly endless research in 
multiple libraries were they able to locate the source of the image. But worse still is the 
fact that an image of a trough, a vaguely telephone-like shape that is commonly set in 
front and below the animal figures on the seals, was added to the image in order to give 
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the impression that it was not broken, ultimately clinching the case that the manipulated 
image was intentionally fabricated. In this way, disingenuous approaches and a faux 
academic air are often sufficient to persuade non-specialist, non-academic audiences 
and for that reason often characterize revisionist history (Witzel and Farmer 2000).
Witzel and Farmer demonstrate using photographs that the horse image was an intentional 
manipulation (Witzel and Farmer 2000).
 Another disturbing angle appears from within representational chaos; another 
article by Steve Farmer makes the serious accusation of fraud (Farmer 2003), but 
makes a similar misuse of representation to the accused. The issue is the handling of a 
comparative approach to the (assumed) script by a “comparative linguist and Sinologist” 
of the late 19th century, Terrien de Lacouperie. Lacouperie compares representations of 
the script portion of the first seal published with a representation of the Chinese Yolo, or 
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Yi, script. According to Farmer: “Lacouperie backed his claims by faking a little 
evidence, N.S. Rajaram style. … The aim of the forgery, which went undetected for 120 
years, was not political but academic” (Farmer 2003, 2). Farmer rightly draws attention 
to the problematic selection, decontextualization and re-representation of the “legend,” 
or script portion, but Farmer’s own use of representation proves equally problematic 
while his indictment of Lacouperie is overstated and unfair.
Farmer presents Lacouperie’s transliteration of Cunningham’s representation as fraudulent by 
anachronistically faulting him for not perceiving the constructed and standardized abstract signs 
that only Farmer himself supplies (on the far left) (Farmer 2003).
 Lacouperie re-represents only the script portion of Cunningham’s line-
representation. Cunningham’s line-representation was the first published and only 
available image; Cunningham did not include a photograph along with his drawing of 
seal, nor did he select, abstract, or standardize the “script” portion of the image, 
although he did judge that “there is an inscription in six characters, which are quite 
unknown to me. They are certainly not Indian letters …” (Cunningham/ASI 1875, 108). 
Cunningham’s only culpability in this case is the lack of an accompanying photograph to 
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support his representation. His supposedly disastrous and unshakeable verdict of 
“script” is actually not so emphatically stated but tentative and somewhat ambiguous: an 
“inscription” of “unknown” “characters” and “not Indian letters.” But the omission of a 
photo left Lacouperie only Cunningham’s representation. Lacouperie showed too much 
license in not providing Cunningham’s full seal representation and only redrawing the 
“script” portion sideways and out of context; this is epistemologically problematic 
methodology but hardly fraud. Lacouperie’s representation of the signs corresponds 
quite closely to Cunningham’s representation; some of the signs do appear to be more 
rounded in Lacouperie’s signs than in Cunningham’s, and this modification does serve 
his comparative agenda. Farmer, however, disproportionally exaggerates the 
discrepancy between the two transcriptions by presenting a third column with the fully 
abstracted and regularized script signs that makes Lacouperie guilty of fraud for not 
seeing in Cunningham’s representation. However, it would have been impossible for 
Lacouperie to have seen those images because they are the most fully constructed 
signs or characters of all three representations in question; they are the standardized 
transcriptions that have been abstracted through the comparison of the images of 
myriad seals and artifacts examined firsthand, through photography, and through 
manual and mechanical selections and reproductions over a wide range of abstraction 
and standardization. Farmer indicts Lacouperie: “Note the close match between what 
Lacouperie claimed were the Harppan and Lolo signs, despite the fact that the right-
most and left-most signs on the Indus inscription were clearly mutilated” (ibid.). But 
Farmer only establishes the “clear mutilation” of the Cunningham signs in comparison to 
the more conventionalized signs that he himself supplies; it is not evident from 
Cunningham’s sole image representation that the seal is damaged, nor from 
Cunningham’s two line drawings of the shape of the seal in profile. Farmer, like both 
Cunningham and Lacouperie, does not include a photograph of the seal, or of an 
impression. 
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Cunningham’s representation of the first discovered seal (Cunningham 1875).
Photograph of its sealing (left) and the first discovered seal (right) (BBC and The British Library).
 
 The seal and sealing shown here in photograph represent the seal I believe may 
be the source-image in question, although the orientation of Cunningham’s 
representation corresponds to a sealing rather than the seal. The “inscription” portion 
appears identical to Cunningham’s, and does not appear to my untrained eye to be 
mutilated. The end characters or signs correspond well with Cunningham’s reproduction 
and not with Farmer’s standardized versions that he indicts Lacouperie with fraud for 
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not seeing. Cunningham’s representation differs most drastically from the photograph 
regarding the two small images in front and below of the head of the animal figure; 
Cunningham reproduces a star shape for the nucleus-like mass of ovals and a stack of 
oblong ovals for an equitably crosshatched box. Also, the orientation of Cunningham’s 
representation is reversed, as if produced from a sealing or a photograph of a sealing 
rather than the seal itself, unless Cunningham’s representation was itself reversed. 
 The questionable claim of the effective refutation of the “Indus script hypothesis” 
has challenged the presupposition that the status of “script” can be immediately visually 
determined and differentiated from “image.” This has exposed certain problematic 
aspects in the methodology and epistemology of representation, such as selection, 
abstraction, decontextualization, construction, standardization, presentation, and the re-
representation of constructed representational images. Each such progressive aspect is 
susceptible to presupposition, preference, convenient omission, and ideological 
influence. Apparently the most methodologically problematic representation is of the 
unknown; there is a distinct preference for the omission of the admission that we do not 
actually know whether or not the images from the ancient Indus Valley contain a script. 
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Women in Kashmir: A Feminist Autoethnography
by Hafsa Kanjwal
Introduction
During the summer of 2010, the Valley of Kashmir, where I was born and where most of 
my extended family resides, witnessed a mass-uprising after the killings of civilians, 
mainly youth, by the Indian security forces. Although the past three summers in Kashmir 
have been fraught with protests and deaths, this summer was especially violent in terms 
of the number of people killed, injured and taken into custody.1  I was in Srinagar, the 
capital of Kashmir, for two months during this volatile time period. Every day, there were 
protests and calls for strikes, and there were often government-imposed curfews during 
points of extreme tension and violence. The protesters demanded an end to the Indian 
military occupation of Kashmir, as well as independence, or azaadi, from the Indian 
state. Schools, offices, shops, and restaurants remained closed for the majority of the 
summer and well into the Fall. Most people, including my family and myself, remained 
indoors, effectively under house arrest. I was only able to leave home a few times 
during the entire summer, and one time in particular, came across a women’s protest a 
few kilometers from my home. I was with a friend who was a journalist from the States. 
She was writing a story for Al-Jazeera English on the role of women in the resistance 
movement in Kashmir.
 My interest in writing this essay was sparked by my experience that day at the 
women’s protest, where I served as an impromptu translator for my journalist friend. 
This experience, and  the summer as a whole, challenged my personal assumptions 
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1 For more information on the events of this past summer, please see the coverage of the crisis by the New York 
Times section on Kashmir: http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/kashmir/index.html.  
Of note, is Arundhati Roy’s article, “Kashmir’s Fruits of Discord”, published on November 8, 2010.
about the role of women in the resistance movement in Kashmir. It also challenged me 
to think about my own role as a Kashmiri-American in relation to these women. This 
paper seeks to combine a self-reflexive ethnographic narrative and analytical approach 
to discuss the changing role of women’s resistance in the Kashmir Valley.
 I am inspired to combine these two methodological approaches as a result of the 
enactment of hybridity that Kirin Narayan argues for in her article “How Native is a 
‘Native’ Anthropologist?” She argues for a removal of the wall that divides “narrative 
(associated with subjective knowledges) and analysis (associated with objective truths)” 
and proposes that by “situating ourselves as subjects simultaneously touched by life-
experience and swayed by professional concerns, we can acknowledge the hybrid and 
positioned nature of our identities. Writing texts that mix lively narrative and rigorous 
analysis involves enacting hybridity regardless of our origin” (Narayan 1993, 300). Using 
memory, reports, newspaper articles, photography, and transnational feminist theory on 
women and resistance, I argue against essentialist explanations of Kashmiri women‟s 
experience through the dominant Orientalist and imperialist frameworks. Historically 
situated in the earliest encounters between Islam and the West, these frameworks 
highlight the victimhood of Muslim women, seeing them primarily as objects and not 
subjects of their destinies. I suggest that the role of Kashmiri women in the resistance is 
constantly changing in light of historical, social and political circumstances. At the end of 
the paper, I will offer a combined methodological approach for studying these women’s 
lives, comprised of historically situated methodologies, decolonizing methodologies, and 
activist methodologies.
Diasporic Tensions
During one of the days when traffic was allowed on the streets, I accompanied my 
journalist friend to serve as a translator for some of her interviews. She was working on 
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a feature story about women’s participation in the mass agitation. We had planned to 
interview several women who were involved with the separatist groups. On our way, we 
unexpectedly came across a women’s protest. A group of around thirty women, dressed 
in bright flowered tunics and pants had formed in the middle of the street, blocking the 
traffic, and chanting pro-freedom slogans. A line of Indian security forces stood on the 
side, about 100 feet away, watching the protest without interfering.
 We went over to the women, with a camera in my hand. In my Kashmiri, I asked 
the women why they were protesting—had they faced any acts of violence? Did they 
have any relatives or friends who had been killed? How had the turmoil affected their 
day-to-day lives? Although a few women answered my questions, a number of them 
became agitated. One went on to say, “if you had seen what we have seen, you would 
not be carrying that camera and pen and paper. You would drop everything and join our 
protests.” Shocked, I could only respond, “I will try to share your stories with people 
outside Kashmir.”
 This incident highlights some of the tensions that I, possessing the hybridity of 
being both Kashmiri and American, confront during my visits to the region. Although 
born in Kashmir, I have spent a majority of my life in the United States, educated in elite 
institutions. At the protest, I had the visible markers of “difference”—a foreign Kashmiri 
accent, a conspicuous style of dress, and the possession of technology that marked me 
as belonging to a higher class. Unintentionally, I further perpetuated this sense of 
“difference” by showcasing the privilege that I had to “share their stories” with people 
outside of Kashmir.
 This diasporic tension I faced inevitably relates to notions of my own cultural 
identity. In “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” Stuart Hall discusses a divergent view of 
cultural identity. While a dominant view foregrounds the similarities within a cultural 
formation (Kashmir, American), the divergent view points to deep and significant 
difference, “which constitutes what we really are…or rather since history has intervened, 
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what we have become” (Hall 1993, 394). He further states, “Cultural identities come 
from somewhere, have histories. But, like everything which is historical, they undergo 
constant transformation….they are subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture 
and power” (Hall 1993, 394). In my case, the history was my leaving Kashmir with my 
family during the height of the militancy in the early 1990s and settling into a new life in 
the United States. In my encounter with these women, I felt a sense of privilege that 
made me uncomfortable. There were differences in power—language, class, education. 
I remember thinking that it was a strange fortune that gave me the opportunity to live an 
alternate reality, and it didn’t seem fair that these women did not have that same 
chance.
 In some ways, I was forced to recognize my entrenchment in the ideology of U.S. 
Empire as a member of the Kashmiri diaspora. As Engseng Ho describes of diasporas 
in “Empire Through Diasporic Eyes”, “the subversives who peopled such movements 
[diasporas] were mobile cosmopolitans whose agendas were presumably extra-
territorial….their geographical mobility often meant crossing imperial and departmental 
jurisdictions, stretching the capacity of empire for political intelligence….an inferior, 
subaltern entity which was nevertheless diasporic, cosmopolitan, and sophisticated like 
empire itself, and enough so to represent a potential threat” (Ho 2004, 240). In the case 
of my entry into the women‟s protest, one may ask what the “potential threat” that I 
instigated would entail. I was evidently trying to craft a narrative of these women‟s lives 
that would be most compelling for the American audience. By asking sensational 
questions, it was clear what I, as an interviewer, wanted something specific out of these 
women—their sense of injustice, their anger, their tragic renderings. Why was it my 
agenda to situate these women firmly in the context of victimhood? Although the 
injustices committed by the Indian state apparatus against these women were many, 
why did I, as a Muslim Kashmiri woman, want to continue to depict these women in the 
usual Orientalist and imper ialist tropes of oppression and victimization?
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 My personal desire to interview these women as victims was meant to shed light 
on the broader context of suffering of the Kashmiri people under the Indian occupation. 
However, in framing my questions, I fell into the same dangers of the “politics of 
representation” that post- colonial and transnational feminist theorists critique. They 
urge the researcher to be careful about how she represents a group of people, 
especially one that has been historically margina lized, as any act of (mis)representation 
has the potential of enacting violence on the researched. Kamala Visweswaran, in 
Fictions of Feminist Ethnography, admits that in the process of research, there will 
especially be complications for those with hyphenated identities. It is easy to fall into 
and add to the dominant representations of a group. Yet, she argues, those who fall into 
these identities are situated in a place “to be moved by different sets of questions 
concerning power, domination and representation…how we may ourselves be 
positioned (and not always by choice in opposition to dominant discourses and 
structures of power)” (Visweswaran 1994, 140). This oppositional ethnography will 
situate my own role in relation to these women by enacting hybridity and will also 
challenge dominant concepts of Kashmiri womanhood. My goal is not to downplay the 
violence and suffering experienced by Kashmiri women, but rather, to offer an 
alternative set of methodologies from which to view these representations.
Dominant Representations of Kashmiri Women
At this point, I would like to examine these dominant representations of Kashmiri women
—representations that I had in many ways internalized. After discussing these dominant 
understandings, I will address some of the current manifestations of resistance by 
Kashmiri women, including the phenomenon of the “stone-throwing housewives” and 
how these challenge the traditionally-held assumptions about the role of women in the 
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conflict. I will then relate these manifestations to transnational themes of women and 
resistance, especially in the Muslim world.2
 To begin my discussion of the dominant representations of Kashmiri women, I 
would like to share a photograph that best expresses the sense of “passive victimhood” 
that is prevalent in all of these representations. Although the use of photography in 
essays such as this can be problematic, I seek to employ two particular pictures to show 
how they mark a stark contrast to each other, and how they characterize the themes I 
explore in this paper.3  Thus, it is in relation to the broader discourses surrounding the 
changing role of women in Kashmir that I am including these pictures—not to have them 
serve as actual representations of the roles of women.
 This first picture shows a group of women watching a funeral procession from 
their window.4 The women are crying, mourning, and beating their chests. This is one of 
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2 I use the term “Muslim world” to describe Muslim-majority nations around the world.
3 The use of photography in writing these anthropological essays has been looked down upon given the use of 
photography by anthropologists during the colonial period to situate and represent the “native other.” There are 
oftentimes concerns about sensationalizing a particular representation, and thus this issue remains contested within 
anthropology today. However, a variety of anthropologists do make use of photography, including Vita by Joao Biehl 
and Righteous Dopefiend by Philippe Bourgois and Jeff Schonberg.
4 This photo was taken by Dar Yasin of Associated Press.
the many images of Kashmiri female passive victimhood—these women remain 
emotional bystanders to the violence enacted upon them and their communities. They 
watch the protests from afar, not taking part. They find expression in mourning the 
deaths of their husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers. What is important to note in most 
of these dominant representations is that the women’s expression is situated in their 
role in relation to the men in their lives—as mothers, wives, and daughters. One of the 
more public examples of this expression is the organization Association of Parents of 
Disappeared Persons (APDP), run by Parvina Ahangar. APDP’s activities are regularly 
featured in the local newspapers. Ahangar’s 16-year old son was abducted by Indian 
forces. She would routinely visit and wait outside of the doors of police buildings, 
demanding a right to know about her son’s whereabouts. In time, other mothers and 
wives of the disappeared men joined her. Ahangar has brought together hundreds of 
families of missing persons and forced the Indian government to admit that around 
4,000 people are in custody as a result of the conflict.5  Moments of intensified 
nationalisms, resistance, or war position women as “mothers of the nation.” I want to 
make it clear that I do not view this as solely a sign of oppression; in fact, I believe that 
this representation can be liberating for the women, as evidenced with Ahangar‟s 
activism as a mother and how she has mobilized this marginalized group in Kashmiri 
society. However, this positioning is “traditional” as it is situated in the context of the 
woman’s role in relation to the men around her.6
 Of course, these women are often the recipients of violence themselves, most 
prominently sexual violence. A 2005 report by Doctors without Borders noted that 
Kashmir has some of the highest rates of sexual violence in any conflict region (Batrawy 
2010). During the summer of 2009, similar protests rocked Kashmir as a result of the 
Women in Kashmir
57
5 Human rights groups say the figure is closer to 9,000. These numbers were taken from Aya Batrawy’s article in Al- 
Jazeera English.
6 A comparative case-study can be made in reference to Palestine. Please see Rhoda Ann Kanaaneh’s “Birthing the 
Nation: Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel.”
alleged rape and death of two women by security forces in the town of Shopian.7 
Kashmiri women’s bodies, as with the bodies of women in other conflict areas, remain 
the vehicle through which the violence of occupation and resistance is enacted.8 One of 
the most gripping incidents of this violence was in the early years of the Kashmiri 
militancy. In February 1991, Indian security forces launched a search and interrogation 
operation in the village of Kunan Poshpora, in Kashmir’s remote Kupwara district. 
Upwards of 100 women were gang-raped by the security forces, although the Indian 
government denied these allegations.9  A report conducted in 1994 by the Women‟s 
Initiative featured the testimony of several of the alleged victims. They complained of 
ostracism from their families and communities because of the “shame” associated with 
having been raped. Some victims committed suicide after the incident and not a single 
marriage proposal had been received for any woman, raped or not, in the village years 
for after the incident (Dewan 1994, 2654).
 These abuses against women occur not only by the Indian security forces and 
paramilitary forces, but also by the members of the various militant groups operating in 
Kashmir.10  Ironically, both the militant groups and the Indian security forces posit 
themselves as the protectors of women against the other. The stories of these abuses 
provide fodder for the nationalist resistance—it is in the language of protecting the 
women’s chastity and izzat (honor, respect) that the movement gains its legitimacy.
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7 For more information on the Shopian deaths and the aftermath, please read the New York Times article:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/25/world/asia/25kashmir.html.
8 To read about the use of rape during times of war, please read Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, edited by Alexandra Stiglmayer and Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking.
9 For more information on the Kunan Poshpora gang-rapes, please see Human Rights in India: Kashmir Under Siege, 
An Asia Watch Report and Abdication of Responsibility: The Commonwealth and Human Rights, a report by Human 
Rights Watch.
10 These militant groups are either pro-independence or pro-Pakistan. Accusations of rape have mainly been 
leveraged against the pro-Pakistan militant groups as well as militant groups set up by the Indian government for 
counter-insurgency purposes. For more information on rape in Kashmir, please see the report by Physicians for 
Human Rights.
 The final representation, and one that is often deployed by the Indian security 
forces, is of the Kashmiri woman who is forced to hide or assist a militant. Again, she 
does not enact any agency in her decision to do so—she has no ideological sympathies 
with the militancy. She only does it because of fear of retribution or violence. 
Oftentimes, media representations on the internet, TV, and newspapers, claim that she 
is “duped” into doing so. This representation was scaled to Bollywood proportions in a 
film entitled Mission Kashmir, which came out in 2000. In the movie, a naïve, innocent 
Kashmiri girl falls in love with her childhood friend, who ends up being a militant on a 
murder mission to avenge the death of his family. He uses her to put his plan into 
action, and she is eventually led to work with the local police to reveal his plans. The 
representation, once again, is of the Kashmiri woman in between conflicting ideologies, 
a victim of the forces around her.
 It is through these representations of passive victimhood that the Kashmiri 
woman has been represented in dominant discourses on the role of women in the 
Kashmir conflict and in the resistance. As a mourning mother, a rape victim, and an 
innocent bystander, the Kashmiri woman is a recipient of action, and only expresses her 
agency in relation to the men in her life and the “traditional” roles she plays in society. 
These roles fit neatly into existing Orientalist and imperialist tropes of Muslim women.
 In my own encounter with the protesting women, I internalized these roles in how 
I approached my questions during the interview. How had the women suffered? Was 
anyone in her family killed or taken into custody? In seeking these stories of 
victimization, I wanted to place direct blame on the Indian occupation for subjugating 
these women. Yet, in doing so, I denied these women the right to be seen as agents 
and enactors of resistance to the Indian occupation in ways that did not fit neatly into 
hegemonic discourses. Only when I saw the images of the “stone-throwing housewives” 
did I begin to question my own assumptions of the role women have played in the 
Kashmir conflict.
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The New Kashmiri Women
This second photograph from the protests this past summer, reflects the changing role 
of Kashmiri women in the conflict.11 This image stands in direct contrast to the dominant 
representations—here, a middle-aged Kashmiri woman takes part in the stone-throwing 
against the Indian army. Usually, this activity is reserved for the youth—primarily, 
teenage-aged boys. As Sanjay Kak, a filmmaker who created Jashn-e-Azaadi, a film 
about how India‟s Independence Day is celebrated in Kashmir, describes in an article 
for The Times of India:
 But now an unfamiliar new photograph of the Kashmiri woman has begun to take 
 its place on newspaper front pages. She's dressed in ordinary salwar-kameez, 
 pastel pink, baby blue, purple and yellow. Her head is casually covered with a 
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11 This photo, taken by Tauseef Mustafa of AFP/Getty Images, was displayed on a number of social media sites such 
as Facebook and local Kashmiri blogs.
 dupatta and she seems unconcerned about being recognized. She is often 
 middle aged, and could even be middle-class. And she is carrying a stone. A 
 weapon directed at the security forces. Last week, in a vastly under-reported 
 story, a massive crowd stopped two Indian Air Force vehicles on the highway 
 near Srinagar [the summer capital of Kashmir]. At the forefront were hundreds of 
 women. The airmen and their families were asked to dismount, and move to the 
 safety of a nearby building. Then the buses were torched. This is not a rare 
 incident: women are everywhere in these troubled times in Kashmir, and not in 
 the places traditionally assigned to them. They are collecting stones and throwing 
 them, and assisting the young men in the front ranks of the protestors to disguise 
 themselves, even helping them escape when the situation gets tough (Kak 
 2010).
Kak argues that it is “no ordinary anger, but an old, bottled-up rage, gathered over so 
many years that it has settled, and turned rock hard. That accumulated fury is the stone 
in her hand” (Kak).  The increasing fury, frustration, and sense of marginalization felt by 
the Kashmiri masses as a whole has changed the manifestations of resistance 
expressed by these women. No longer are they recipients of action, but actors 
themselves, and oftentimes in ways that could be considered “non-traditional” within a 
sphere of gendered norms. Notions of victimhood are not overlooked, but rather 
transformed into a desire to dramatically alter their circumstances. Of course, this is not 
to say that Kashmiri women have not enacted their agency through active resistance in 
the past, but rather, that the “terms of engagement” of these expressions are 
dramatically changing and do not neatly fit into traditional modes of women‟s 
involvement.
 Undoubtedly, the modes of resistance by women have changed because their 
roles in society itself have transformed due to the recent turmoil. Women are becoming 
the primary breadwinners in many families because of the number of men killed or 
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disappeared over the years. Yet, there is still a view of the “ideal, traditional” role 
women would have played if it were not for the occupation. I was struck by a comment 
made by a close relative who exclaimed, “Look at how bad it has gotten. These women 
should be at home, taking care of their families, not on the streets throwing rocks.” At 
the protest I observed, I noticed that the Indian security forces did not seem too 
concerned about the women protestors and were watching them with amusement. 
Although they are now well aware that women have thrown rocks too, they also seem to 
be at odds with this new reality—as it challenges their own experiences with enforcing a 
sense of victimization upon these women. Despite how these new roles continue to play 
out in society and how they are perceived by the security forces, the past two decades 
have undoubtedly left a mark that has reshaped gender relations and representations.
 In addition to the number of local and regional factors that contribute to this shift, 
including the ongoing occupation, it is important to take note of the transnational issues 
that also impact the changing role of women and resistance in Kashmir. These issues 
relate to increasing U.S. imperialism and quasi-imperialism throughout the Muslim 
world, especially in light of the War on Terror. The focus is not merely on how the 
Muslim man is becoming radicalized, but also how the Muslim woman is becoming 
radicalized. No longer is the Muslim woman a mere victim, but she is a necessary 
component of the Islamist threat. Because the Muslim man has faced such scrutiny, it is 
now the responsibility of the Muslim woman to follow in his footsteps. The newfound 
fixation with the Muslim-woman-as-threat is manifested through the obsession with the 
nikab in a number of European countries (as a marker of extremism) as well as the 
female suicide bomber in places such as Palestine and Iraq.
 The stone-throwing Kashmiri woman demands a translation, because the 
traditional view holds that only non-violent activities can be accepted as genuine 
expressions of women‟s will— since women are essentially non-violent. This traditional 
view would see the enactment through a “male mode of resistance”—such as stone-
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throwing—as one in which the woman is again being duped. Indian security forces 
repeatedly narrate that the separatist groups force women to be in protests so that 
these women can serve as a shield to protect the militants and restrain the forces from 
firing into the crowds.
 The Muslim-woman-as-threat trope is also reflected through understandings of 
Islamist political mobilizations that cater primarily to women. An organization that gains 
much coverage in Kashmir is the Duktaran-i-Millat, (Daughters of the Faithful) an 
Islamist separatist female-led group in Kashmir. What initially began as a reformist 
organization to inculcate Islamic values in what they considered an increasingly 
decadent society in the late 1980s became one of the first organizations to lend its 
moral support to the militancy. The organization has gained notoriety for tearing down 
obscene pictures, patrolling neighborhoods for acts of indecency, and throwing acid on 
women who were not dressed modestly. Although the organization does not have much 
popular support, its activities are widely reported in the Indian and inter national media 
as a warning of “what would happen to Kashmir if we left and the Islamist militants took 
over.”12
 In a post-9/11 context, the Muslim woman emerges as a threat. This past year, 
Bollywood came out with another film on Kashmir, entitled Lamhaa. In contrast to the 
other film mentioned, in this film the Kashmiri woman is in the role of a terrorist herself 
by abetting militant-terrorist activity. This film sheds light on how the Kashmiri nationalist 
struggle has been usurped by India under the framework of “terrorism,” undoubtedly 
inspired by the U.S. War on Terror. In doing so, India aims to obtain sympathy with the 
international community and delegitimize the aspirations of the Kashmiri people.
 These examples showcase a new Kashmiri woman—one who is defined by her 
action, and not by her passivity. This woman has suffered greatly since the rise of the 
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5028844.stm
militancy, and has decided to take matters—or stones—into her own hands. By aiding 
and taking part in protests, stone-throwing, and hiding the youth who face arrest, this 
new Kashmiri woman has altered the dynamics of the resistance. Her community is not 
sure what to make of her, and neither are the Indian security forces. The international 
community is able to see her in a light shared by women in other parts of occupied 
Muslim lands—the Muslim-woman-as-threat. They are worried about the ideological 
influence of Islamist thought in her reinvention. She defies traditional stereotypes and 
creates new ones.
 In my attempts to relate to the new Kashmiri woman, I am faced with a tension 
felt by many other feminists in diasporas. The new woman provides an alternative 
narrative than the one of victimization. I can relate to her subjectivity and the ways in 
which she renders herself visible and vocally resists against occupation and oppression. 
Nonetheless, I am still reminded of her predecessor—the one who has been victimized, 
raped, and made invisible. In the back of my mind, the question remains: How do we 
talk about the struggles, marginalization, and sense of victimization of Kashmiri women 
without falling into Orientalist tropes?
Conclusions
I would like to conclude by offering a methodological argument for researchers in 
studying these women’s lives in Kashmir.  In addition to the enactment of hybridity, an 
approach to writing that mixes narrative and rigorous analysis, I also propose a 
historically situated methodology, a decolonizing methodology, and an activist 
methodology. A historically situated methodology is one that recognizes all forms of 
knowledge production as being situated it its particular time and place. Much of this 
entails a deconstruction of previously held essentialist assumptions about a given 
culture, nation, people, or religion and a desire to understand a given context on its own 
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terms.13 In the case of Kashmir, this would entail taking into account the political history 
of the region, which has undoubtedly impacted women‟s lives, especially in recent 
decades. I would also argue that a historically situated methodology would not only take 
into account local factors, but also be able to link it to broader, global, transnational 
historical forces, thus dismantling the local/global dichotomy. When studying the 
ongoing Kashmiri resistance, this would entail a reflection on empire and the War on 
Terror.
 A decolonizing methodology works against colonialist and Orientalist 
frameworks.14  It does not see all knowledge as objective, but rather subjective and 
situated. It is cognizant of the politics of knowledge production, especially of the role of 
the researcher in relation to the researched. The researcher is in a position of power 
and must think carefully about how he/she would represent the community with 
responsibility and accountability especially because “representational practices 
[photography and ethnography] are torn between objectifying and humanizing; 
exploiting and giving voice; propagandizing and documenting injustice; stigmatizing and 
revealing; fomenting voyeurism and promoting empathy; stereotyping and 
analyzing” (Bourgois 2009, 15). For the researcher, this entails a strong understanding 
of his/her role—a self-reflexive approach that must be inherent to any form of 
knowledge production.
 Finally, a decolonizing methodology also corresponds with an activist research 
methodology.15  This methodology situates the researcher as not only studying the 
community, but also working alongside the community in efforts to improve their 
condition—whether it be their political, economic, or social condition. The researcher 
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48-49 and 68-72).
14 For more on decolonizing methodologies, please see Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s book Decolonizing Methodologies:
Research and Indigenous Peoples.
15 Smith’s book also discusses activism and research and how one can be accountable to a community.
must have a personal commitment to social justice and an awareness of the political 
circumstances in the area. Given the continuing presence of over 500,000 Indian 
security forces in Kashmir and the regular occurrences of human rights violations, it 
becomes hard to remain a “neutral observer.” A researcher will inevitably be asked how 
he/she views the conflict, no matter how “apolitical” ones projects aims to be. Although 
this role may bring up ethical concerns for a researcher, especially at his/her home 
institution, it is one that must be negotiated.
 Throughout this paper, I have attempted to make use of these diverse 
methodologies in exploring the changing role of women and resistance in Kashmir. By 
incorporating an enactment of hybridity as well as a historically situated, decolonizing 
activist methodology, I have showcased the ways in which Kashmir women are 
challenging traditional assumptions of female victimhood by creating new 
representations.  In doing this essay, I realize that many other issues remain unexplored 
in understanding Kashmiri women’s lives through these methodologies. Further studies 
could examine the changing role of religion in these women‟s lives in addition to issues 
of health, family, education and economics.
 I often think about what questions I would now ask those same women at the 
protest I witnessed last summer. I wouldn’t start with a question, but simply ask them to 
speak. My role as translator would remain—this is the best way I can express my 
academic intervention.
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Redefining Muslim Women: Aga Khan III’s Reforms for 
Women’s Education
by Shenila S. Khoja-Moolji
Abstract: In the history of Muslim India, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century formed a 
period that witnessed intense public contestation over the role of women in society. Against that 
background, this article explores the writings and institutional initiatives of the forty-eighth Imam 
(spiritual leader) of the Shia Ismaili Muslims, Sultan Mahomed Shah Aga Khan III, with 
reference to women’s education. It compares and contrasts his thinking with the foundational 
texts on women’s education written by four other prominent Muslim leaders of that time period: 
Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Nazir Ahmed, Mumtaz Ali and Ashraf Ali Thanawi. An analysis of the 
writings demonstrates that the Aga Khan’s approach was markedly different; while other leaders 
saw women’s roles primarily in the domestic sphere, as dependent daughters, wives or 
mothers, the Aga Khan recognized the dignity of women as individuals worthy in and of 
themselves and not merely due to the function that they performed in society. He, thus, not only 
advocated for women’s education to promote their socioeconomic well-being but also argued for 
it as a basic right that could promote inner happiness through intellectual growth. The article 
discusses a variety of factors that may have influenced the Aga Khan’s thoughts, including 
exposure to first-wave feminism, and concludes with the implications of his reforms for Ismaili 
women today. 
A Note on Sources: The Aga Khan gave much of his guidance to the Ismaili Muslim community 
in the form of farmans (directives). These farmans are private documents, and as such, I have 
limited myself to materials that are readily available through other publications or library 
holdings.
Acknowledgements: The author thanks Professor Ali Asani at Harvard University for his 
guidance in developing this article. 
 
Introduction
Over the last century, the landscape of economic, educational and social opportunities 
available to women has changed significantly. In Muslim India, the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century witnessed intense public contestation over the role of women in 
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society. This was also the time when Indian Muslims were engaged in the balancing act 
of participating in a rapidly modernizing environment under the British colonial 
government while attempting to retain their cultural heritage, traditions and religion. 
Discussions regarding women and their role in the uplift of the Muslim  community 
became symbolic of the many contradictions they faced; debates about women’s 
education, suffrage, legal status, rights in Islam etc. were commonplace and 
demonstrated the deep anxieties of Muslims in colonial India. In this context, the article 
explores the writings and institutional initiatives of the forty-eighth Imam (spiritual 
leader) of the Shia Ismaili Muslims, Sultan Mahomed Shah Aga Khan III (d. 1957). 
Specifically, it compares his thoughts on women’s education with a number of 
foundational texts on the topic written by four other prominent Muslim leaders of that 
time period: Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (d. 1898), Nazir Ahmed (d. 1912), Mumtaz Ali (d. 
1935) and Ashraf Ali Thanawi (d. 1943). After a brief consideration of the Aga Khan’s 
background and his context in colonial India, the article delves into a deeper discussion 
of his writings on women’s education. An analysis of the Aga Khan’s writings 
demonstrates that his approach towards women’s education was markedly different 
than that of his contemporaries. He recognized that women had the same potential as 
men, which informed his conceptualization of the wide-ranging roles they could perform 
in society. He not only advocated for women’s education to promote their 
socioeconomic well-being but also argued for it as a basic right that could promote inner 
happiness through intellectual growth. This recognition of the emancipatory potential of 
education prompted him to institute a range of reforms for his female followers, which 
have had far-reaching impact on their educational, economic and social progress. The 
article discusses a variety of factors that may have influenced the Aga Khan’s views on 
these issues, including exposure to first-wave feminism. It concludes with an 
assessment of the implications of his reforms for Ismaili women today. 
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The Institution of Ismaili Imamat 
The institution of the Ismaili Imamat is represented by the Imam of the time. The Ismaili 
Imams are direct descendants of the final Prophet of Islam, Muhammad. They trace 
their lineage to the Prophet through his daughter, Fatima, and his cousin and son-in-
law, Ali, who was also the first Imam. With respect to their followers, it is the mandate of 
the Imams to “safeguard the individual’s right to personal intellectual search and to give 
practical expression to the ethical vision of society that the Islamic message inspires.”1 
This mandate has translated into wide-ranging efforts by the Imams towards improving 
the quality of life of their followers and the communities in which they live. 
Sultan Mahomed Shah Aga Khan III was born in Karachi, in today’s Pakistan, on 
November 2, 1877. He became the forty-eighth Imam of the Ismaili Muslims at the age 
of eight on the passing away of his father, Aga Ali Shah Aga Khan II. He went on to 
establish himself as an influential political leader, not only in colonial India but also on 
the international scene. Due to his responsibilities as the Imam of Ismaili Muslims and 
as a leader of Indian Muslims, he operated within a variety of socio-political and 
religious contexts that undoubtedly influenced his thoughts and provided him with 
opportunities to further his goals. In his Memoirs he notes his dual responsibilities to 
serve “first, in India, as the leader of an influential group within the wide Muslim 
community at an epoch when political aspirations were stirring and second, as the head 
of a far-ranging international community [of Ismaili Muslims].”2  He worked with the 
British colonial government on a variety of social and political issues aimed at improving 
the quality of life of Indian Muslims. For instance, he helped with the establishment of 
the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, and worked closely with the 
leaders of the Aligarh movement to secure the recognition of Muslims as an 
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1 “His Highness the Aga Khan,” Theismaili.org, accessed October 2, 2011, http://www.theismaili.org/?id=14
2 Sultan Mahomed Shah Aga Khan, The Memoirs of Aga Khan, World Enough and Time (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1954a), 58.
independent political entity. In 1902, he was appointed to the Legislative Council set up 
by Lord Curzon, and in 1906, he was elected as the first President of the Muslim 
political organization, the All-India Muslim League.3  He remained active on the Indian 
political front throughout his life but over time increasingly took on international policy-
orientated tasks, including serving as the President of the League of Nations for a brief 
period.4
While the Aga Khan advocated comprehensive reforms for Muslims both as a 
leader of Indian Muslims and as the Imam of Ismaili Muslims, he adopted a more 
hands-on approach when it came to the latter. It was his religious authority as the Imam 
that allowed him to pioneer a system of social service agencies for the well-being of his 
followers, particularly the women. Before considering his efforts to develop women’s 
education, it is critical to understand the political, religious and social trends in India 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that influenced and informed his 
work.
Context: Colonial India
During the second half of the nineteenth century, India saw the ascendency of the 
British and the decline of the Muslim rule and influence. It was a time of increasing 
anxiety for the Muslims of India, who were concerned about the future of the Muslim 
quam (nation) under foreign rule.5 Muslims underwent a political and social dislocation;6 
the Muslim service gentry such as the court-sponsored ulama (religious scholars), 
poets, qazis (judges), aristocrats etc., who had a claim to authority in the prior 
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arrangements under the Mughul rulers, were increasingly marginalized by colonialism, 
particularly after the 1857 mutiny which cast suspicions on Muslim loyalty to the British 
establishment. The British also articulated their cherished ideal of the separation of 
religion and state, and clearly demarcated the arenas for religion, education, politics, 
and the market. These structural changes motivated a reinterpretation of Islam in order 
to make the religion relevant to the new realities of the Indian Muslims. It was hoped 
that this exercise of reinterpretation and self-reflection would lead to a revival of the 
Muslim quam, and allow them to regain the lost political space and social status. The 
effort of reinterpretation, however, was no longer the exclusive domain of the traditional 
religious scholars or ulama; another group of Muslims – the modernists – emerged and 
participated actively in this endeavor of reviving the Indian Muslims.7 
Broadly, traditionalists – such as the ‘ulama of Dar-al-Ulum at Deoband – sought 
to revive the Muslim community by appealing to textual Islam. They believed that if the 
Muslims of India followed Islam as presented in the foundational texts and eschewed 
the heterodox practices prevalent in India, they would be able to rejuvenate themselves 
socially and politically. Thus, the group aimed to reform the beliefs and practices of 
ordinary believers to bring them in-line with ‘proper’ Islam. The extent of conformity of 
Indian Muslims to these prescriptions of Islam was to be measured by women’s 
religious practices. Women were to reform their superstitious customs and rituals, and 
comply with textual Islam; they were to become the symbols of Islamic morality. 
Traditionalists, therefore, advocated religious education for Muslim women in so far as it 
brought women’s religious practices in-line with their understanding of Islam. This form 
of religious education did not prioritize women’s intellectual engagement with the faith. 
Instead, it focused on elaborating the correct performance of religion for women. In 
addition, most articulations for women’s education by this group excluded the need for 
Shenila S. Khoja-Moolji
73
7 Barbara Metcalf, “Madrasas and Minorities in Secular India,” in Schooling Islam. The Culture and Politics of Modern 
Muslim Education, ed. Robert Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), 94-95.  
secular, scientific education, which was becoming increasingly relevant but was only 
offered outside the domestic sphere.
The modernists – such as Mumtaz Ali and the Aga Khan – on the other hand, 
believed that a combination of religious and secular education was essential for the 
revival of Muslims in India. To them, Muslims needed to take advantage of western 
education and familiarize themselves with the social tools necessary to function and 
compete in the colonial environment. Still, theirs was not an aggressively westernizing 
and secularizing view. The language and directives of Islam deeply influenced them as 
well, as they grounded, articulated and legitimized their programs for social reform 
within the context of Islam. Women featured in their narrative primarily as nurturers of 
civilizations and guardians of domestic happiness, though these reformers made some 
moves towards acknowledging women’s individuality as well. 
Thus, while the leaders from both the traditionalist and the modernist camps 
worked towards addressing the status of Muslims in India on a variety of fronts, 
reforming the religious and social practices of Muslim women remained a key objective 
for them and a barometer for the success of their efforts. It was against this background 
that education for women featured prominently as a primary means to halt the decline of 
the Muslims of India.  
Women’s Education in Colonial India
Muslim reformers were by no means alone in their efforts to reform the status of women 
in India. Hindu reformers had begun focusing on this issue since the early nineteenth 
century as is evidenced by the reforms against the customs of Sati (burning of widows) 
and the campaigns in South India to suppress the devdasi system (marrying women to 
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a deity or temple).8  There was a general agreement among Muslim leaders, including 
Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Nazir Ahmed, Mumtaz Ali, Ashraf Ali Thanawi and the Aga 
Khan, on the need for educating women. While they agreed in principle, they differed on 
the extent to which women should be educated and what that education would look like. 
The cause of their differences seems to be rooted in their divergent views of women 
and gender roles.9
The Aga Khan opposed the social, religious, political and cultural structures and 
institutions that excluded women from the public sphere, deprived them of opportunities 
to make a living, or limited their rights. Realizing the interconnectedness of women’s 
issues and the ‘intersectionality’10 of their lives, he urged comprehensive reforms to all 
aspects of women’s experience. His efforts for women’s educational advancement, 
hence, were not undertaken in isolation, but impacted, and were impacted by, his efforts 
to reform women’s legal, political and religious status. Therefore, even as we focus on 
the Aga Khan’s reforms in the realm of education, it is crucial to take into account the 
comprehensive nature of his approach to women’s emancipation. For instance, in 
arguing for the provision of primary education for girls on the grounds of gender 
equality, he remained aware of the important role that local philanthropists and 
reformers could play in promoting education, and therefore, demanded appropriate and 
favorable legislation for their operational efforts as well.11 
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The Aga Khan placed extraordinary emphasis on the education for women so as 
to enable them to direct their own lives and obtain personal happiness. He sought to 
provide women with the tools with which they could better their own situations, as well 
as improve the welfare of their families. He said, “I am trying to guide our young 
women’s lives into entirely new channels. I want to see them able to earn their living in 
trades and professions, so that they are not economically dependent on marriage, nor a 
burden on their fathers and brother.”12  In contrast, most other articulations for the 
necessity of women’s education were based on the impact of such an education on 
women’s abilities to manage their households, educate their children and practice 
proper Islam; women were the guardians of Islamic morality and their education was to 
help further communal goals. It was believed that if women could get an education in 
the religious sciences, they would be able to contribute to the proper upbringing of their 
children and maintain peaceful homes for their husbands. 
This was the line of thought adopted by intellectuals such as Nazir Ahmed and 
Ashraf Ali Thanawi. Nazir Ahmed in his novel Mirat ul-Aroos (The Bride’s Mirror), 
published in 1869, employs the character of Asghari to exemplify the model Muslim 
woman – a woman who has elementary education of religious sciences, is an expert at 
household management, and abides by Muslim practices. Due to her education and 
intelligence, she is able to create a happy and harmonious home for her husband and 
in-laws. Asghari is educated at home in a zenana-based school system, similar to those 
attended by the upper class ashraf (elite) Muslim women of the time. Since upper class 
Muslim women practiced seclusion, they were educated at home by visiting ustanis 
(female teachers), who were usually the wives and daughters of the maulvis (religious 
functionaries) and had limited literary skills.13  The content of education at the zenanas 
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typically consisted of memorizing passages of the Quran and reading some Arabic, 
Persian and Urdu script.14 By focusing on the education of females in a zenana-style 
school system, Nazir Ahmed avoids commenting on the access to education for 
working-class Muslim women. Despite having written this novel with the intention of 
providing some literature for Muslim women to study,15 he seems to be more concerned 
about the future of the ashraf Muslims than the welfare of the Indian Muslim women at 
large. 
Similarly, Ashraf Ali Thanawi in his text Bahishti Zewar (Heavenly Ornaments), 
published in 1905, provides detailed guidance to women on religious rituals, duties, 
laws and etiquette, in the hopes to cure their corrupt beliefs and practices.16 The text is 
a discursive effort in constructing women as the guardian of Islamic morality in an 
environment where the authority of Muslims, especially the ulama, was being 
threatened. Thanawi details the proper etiquette for religious practices, acceptable 
relations between men and women, nuances of public transactions such as loans, 
contracts, and property ownership, and the rights of men and women according to 
Islamic law, among other things. He also employs the text to impart basic literacy skills 
to his female readers, which could potentially have enhanced their authority within their 
families.17 Recognizing that his text is of an introductory nature, Thanawi encourages 
women to study advanced religious sciences.18  However, he does not propose a plan 
for women to accomplish this. As noted earlier, the zenana-school system was limited in 
what it could offer women in terms of educational enhancement. Women, therefore, 
would have had to leave the domestic sphere in order to obtain the advanced 
knowledge that Thanawi proposes. By showing a strong preference for seclusion, 
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Thanawi thus limits his own proposal. Indeed, as Metcalf notes, one of the aims for 
increasing women’s basic literacy skills was to enable them to communicate with the 
outside world without compromising the practices of seclusion.19 Clearly, while Thanawi 
writes about the importance of women’s contributions to society and their elevated 
status, the purpose of his work is not focused on increasing women’s socioeconomic 
well-being through education, but on addressing larger social, economic, and political 
issues. As Zaman notes, while the book deals with women’s issues, its broader function 
seems to be to establish the ulama’s authority to guide Muslims in a time of extensive 
religious contestation.20  Thus, women’s educational advancement appears to be 
important only insofar as it aids religious and communal objectives of the Muslim quam.
We observe a similar viewpoint in the policies adopted by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. 
While of the opinion that Muslims needed to study the English language and western 
sciences in order to recover their status in India, Sir Syed emphasized the education of 
boys over girls. He did not think that education beyond the religious sciences was 
necessary for girls, or that separate schools had to be established for them. Gail Minault 
notes that Sir Syed subscribed to the “trickle-down theory”21  whereby educated men 
would be able to educate their wives, sisters and daughters at home, who in turn might 
educate their sons. According to Sir Syed, “the present state of education among 
Muhammadan females is, in my opinion, enough for domestic happiness, considering 
the present social and economic condition of the life of the Muhammadans of India.”22 
Although a pragmatic stance, Sir Syed’s views were representative of the societal views 
on women’s roles and status: women were to live through their male relations. Note that 
much of the elevation of women’s status granted through this narrative is functional – it 
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is so that they can guard the domestic sphere and instill the proper values in their 
children (especially sons), who will then perform the important tasks of Islam in society. 
In contrast, both Aga Khan III and Mumtaz Ali advocated a broad education for 
women. The Aga Khan believed that education for girls should not stop with basic 
literary or elementary religious knowledge, but that “all knowledge in the world should 
be open to girls.”23  Similarly, Mumtaz Ali, in his work Huquq un-Niswaan (Women’s 
Rights) published in 1898, argues that since God has given women equal intellectual 
faculties as men, they deserve access to the same education.24 He counters his critics, 
who believed that too much education would lead to vulgarity in women, by noting that 
any education that did so could lead to the same vulgarity in men as well.25  He then 
goes on to present a strategy for expanding women’s education through establishing a 
women’s newspaper, Tahzib un-Niswan (Women’s Culture), and publishing a list of 
novels suitable for study by women.26  Mumtaz Ali, however, is unable to escape the 
then prevalent worldview. To him, the rationale for providing women an education is to 
enable them to develop the skills that could make them better, more interesting 
companions for their husbands.27 His articulation for the need for companionship within 
marriages seems to be premised on the complementarity between the male provider 
and female housewife,28  which leads him to prioritize women’s roles as wives. He, 
therefore, stresses the significance of a well-rounded education for women so that they 
could fulfill their domestic responsibilities.
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We observe that all four Muslim leaders - Ashraf Ali Thanawi, Sir Syed, Nazir 
Ahmed and Mumtaz Ali – focused on women’s education as a means to creating a 
harmonious home and ensuring domestic happiness, and not for women’s own 
emancipation. The idea of the home or private sphere as a source of meaning and 
identity for men is a nineteenth century construction. As noted earlier, with the onset of 
British colonialism, Muslim ashraf men increasingly lost their economic and social 
privileges. They no longer controlled critical public positions and were instead employed 
in non-entrepreneurial and clerical government work. This threatened aspects of their 
masculine identity that were derived from the authority and control they had exercised in 
the public sphere. Even as Muslim masculinity retained its power vis-à-vis Muslim 
femininity, it was increasing losing its place in the masculine hierarchy to non-Muslim, 
western-educated, British masculinities, as well as rapidly secularizing, Hindu 
masculinities. In some ways, this nineteenth century “crisis” of Muslim masculinity is 
similar to the twentieth century “crisis” of American masculinity. Whereas in the latter, 
American men were seeking to locate “internal efficacy and sense of power”29  in 
response to the gains made by the women’s liberation movements, in the former the 
threat arose from the ascendancy of British political, social and economic structures in 
India, as well as the rise of the Hindu working class. New forms of power, thus, had to 
be located and included in the definition of Muslim manhood. It is against this 
background that the domestic sphere was transformed to take on new significance as 
Muslim men sought to draw meaning and identity from it.
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The Aga Khan’s Reformist Ideas
The Aga Khan, like his contemporaries, also wrote about women’s responsibilities in the 
domestic sphere as bearers of the civilization.30  However, he did not define women 
solely through domestic roles. To him, women were not to get an education simply so 
that they were able to educate their children, or become better companions to their 
husbands - he considered education essential for women’s own happiness and welfare. 
By adopting this view, the Aga Khan affirmed the dignity of women as human beings, 
and as individuals worthy in and of themselves and not merely due to the function that 
they performed in society. In his text, India in Transition, the Aga Khan notes that one of 
the reasons why reforms for women’s progress in the realm of education had been slow 
was because they had been motivated by the end purpose of service to the other 
gender and not for women themselves. He suggests that “the constant argument has 
been that of the necessity for providing educated and intelligent wives and daughters, 
sisters and mothers, for the men… the time has come for a full recognition that the 
happiness and welfare of the women themselves, must be the end and purpose of all 
efforts towards improvement.”31  Clearly, his stance on the purpose of women’s 
education is dramatically different when compared to his Muslim contemporaries.
The Aga Khan’s views on women’s capabilities and roles also impacted the way 
he implemented his strategies for women’s education. He argued for universal and 
compulsory access to education for the masses, and worked with the British 
government to instate legislation that would make primary education compulsory, for 
both boys and girls.32 He deplored the disproportionate distribution of literacy between 
the two sexes – “only ten female per mille [sic] as compared with 106 men.”33  In his 
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view, there were a variety of cultural and social constructs that impeded women’s 
access to schools. For instance, he opposed the strict practices of seclusion and 
exaggerated purdah (veiling), which relegated women to the domestic sphere. He noted 
that the exaggerated practices of purdah condemned “…half the population to slavery or 
retirement from an active and gainful life”34 and that “the free social and intellectual part 
played in the life of Arabia by Imam Hussain's daughter, Sakina, and by the daughter of 
Talha and the great grand daughters of Khalifa Abu Bakar can be contrasted with the 
position of women in the 19th century.”35 The Aga Khan considered such practices to be 
misogynistic cultural traditions that had become codified in Islam and resulted in a 
marked decline in the status of women.36  He, therefore, ensured that his female 
followers were free of this restriction; in his Memoirs he notes, “In my grandfather’s and 
my father’s time the Ismailis were far ahead of any other Muslim sect in the matter of 
the abolition of the strict veil, even in extremely conservative countries. I have 
absolutely abolished it; nowadays you will never find an Ismaili woman wearing the 
veil.”37  The release from cultural practices of seclusion enabled his followers to take 
advantage of economic and educational opportunities wherever they found them. In 
contrast, Muslim leaders such as Sir Syed, Ashraf Ali Thanawi and Nazir Ahmed, were 
staunch proponents of strict forms of purdah and preferred educating women at home 
or in zenana-based schools. Even Mumtaz Ali, while advocating the toning down of the 
strict purdah observed by Indian women,38 was neither in favor of its abandonment nor 
for the integration of women in the public school system. The zenana-based schools, 
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however, often translated into schools for the ashraf families and provided limited 
access to educational opportunities for the Indian Muslim women at large. 
In this context, it is also significant to bear in mind that the majority of the Aga 
Khan’s followers were likely not a part of these elite, ashraf Muslim classes. Thus, while 
he advocated for reforms aimed at the advancement of Muslim women in general, he 
remained focused on improving the lives of his female followers. He not only focused on 
eliminating the cultural and social hindrances to women’s education but also instituted 
legal reforms that maximized the chances for his female followers to access 
education.39 He emphasized that a girl should not be married off too young, and instead 
be given a chance to develop and study.40  To ensure that Ismaili girls had this 
opportunity, he outlawed child marriages, and set the minimum age at which Ismaili girls 
and boys could get married.41  He is also noted to have said, “personally, if I had two 
children, and one was a boy and the other a girl, and if I could afford to educate only 
one, I would have no hesitation in giving the higher education to the girl.”42 In doing so, 
he reconstituted the priorities of the Ismaili community. In addition, he supplemented his 
guidance by contributing material resources to advance women’s education. He 
established over 200 schools in India and East Africa during the first half of the 
twentieth century, the first of them in 1905 in Gwadar (in today’s Pakistan) and Mundra 
(in India).43
At the same time, the Aga Khan realized that lasting change in women’s lives 
could not be implemented without a legitimizing environment at the community level that 
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valued women’s education and contributions to society. He, therefore, used his authority 
as the Imam to initiate changes in the social organization of the Ismaili community. He 
appointed women to influential Ismaili social governance bodies and encouraged them 
to serve in leadership positions. Through these appointments, he not only provided 
women the opportunity to lead and build social capital, but also bring their agendas to 
the table. Women were encouraged to organize at the community level and participate 
fully in religious life. As early as the 1920s, Ismaili women had formed volunteer 
organizations in India. The Aga Khan’s wife, Begum Um Habibeh, guided Ismaili women 
through her own example and took on a public role in the leadership of many 
community affairs. The Aga Khan, thus, put in practice an ideal leadership model for his 
community – one that included both men and women. 
Influences on the Aga Khan
The analysis above demonstrates that the Aga Khan was markedly different in his 
approach to women’s education when compared to his contemporaries. Muslim leaders, 
such as Ashraf Ali Thanawi, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Nazir Ahmed and Mumtaz Ali, saw 
women’s roles primarily in the domestic sphere. While they recognized women’s 
capabilities and contributions, they did so by prioritizing women’s identities as 
dependent daughters, wives or mothers. Therefore, their articulations for the need, 
impact and usefulness of women’s education were limited. The Aga Khan, however, 
held a different view of women’s capacities and roles, which seems to have been 
influenced by a variety of factors.
From a young age, the Aga Khan’s travels took him across the world, where he 
met and established relationships with leading aristocrats and government officials. His 
participation in high-level meetings provided him exposure to global trends and ideas in 
all aspects of life, including developments in the educational, social and economic 
Redefining Muslim Women
84
arenas. Indeed, he could not have afforded anything less than a global view since his 
followers resided in many different parts of the world.44  Given the ascendency of 
women’s liberation movements in the United States, Britain and some Muslim nations 
during this time, it would not be incorrect to assume that he was exposed to feminist 
ideas as well. 
The years leading to Egypt’s nationalist revolution in 1919 saw the emergence of 
an organized women’s movement, which was the first of its kind in the Muslim world.45 
Led by Huda Sharawi (d. 1947), the movement argued for women’s suffrage, education 
and changes in personal laws. It, however, had “westernizing, secularizing tendencies” 
and “promoted a feminism that assumed the desirability of progress toward Western-
type societies.”46 An alternate viewpoint was presented under the leadership of Malak 
Hifni Nassef (d. 1918) that was distrustful of Western feminism, and searched for a way 
to articulate emancipation for women within a native, Muslim discourse.47  Similar 
movements for women’s rights emerged in other Muslim regions, such as Palestine, as 
well.48 In the West, American women were agitating for their political rights and, by the 
time the nineteenth amendment for women’s enfranchisement was ratified in 1920, 
large segments of women had been mobilized in the United States. Analogous 
developments were taking place in Britain as well, where women were contesting 
Victorian ideals of femininity, actively obtaining education and working outside the 
home. Many English women chose to work as missionaries and travelled to India and 
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Africa to further bolster their claims for independence.49 In this era of contestation over 
women’s roles and capacities, the Aga Khan might not only have been aware of these 
discourses about women’s rights, but also influenced by them. 
For instance, in his text, India in Transition, in a chapter entitled, Status of 
Women, the Aga Khan brings to bear similar arguments for Indian women’s 
enfranchisement as those put forward by American and English suffragists. He appears 
to be acutely aware of the gendered concept of full citizenship – one that is based on 
the ability to bear arms – and highlights Indian women’s participation in the army during 
the Great War as a case for women’s enfranchisement.50  He notes that, “the natural 
material for feminist progress in India is good, but it is artificially kept in swaddling 
clothes.”51  Separately, in a letter to The Times on August 8, 1919, he disagrees with 
Lord Southborough’s denial of suffrage for Indian women on the grounds that Muslim 
women in purdah would not be willing to go to the polling booths; he argues that 
“purdah ladies go into the law and registration courts all over the country, and give 
evidence in relation to the transfer of property,”52 and that women’s electoral franchise is 
an issue of justice. Clearly, the Aga Khan was familiar with feminist arguments for 
women’s equality and through his reforms encouraged the use of this “natural material 
for feminist progress” to produce social change in India.
In addition to exposure to feminist ideas, the Aga Khan’s interaction with highly 
accomplished women in India and elsewhere, presented him with alternate models of 
women’s role in society. In his Memoirs he discusses being impressed with the 
intellectual prowess and character of women such as Queen Victoria, Florence 
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Nightingale, Lady Randolph (Winston Churchill’s mother) and Fatima Jinnah53. Women 
with whom he had relations reflected high degrees of independence: his second wife, 
Teresa Magliano, was a professional ballerina and later attained international acclaim 
as a sculptor,54  and his third wife, Andrѐe Carron, had a dressmaking shop in Paris.55 
These women represented to him what women could achieve when provided with 
adequate opportunities. In that vein, it is also essential to investigate the role that the 
Aga Khan’s own mother, Nawab Aaliya Shams-ul-Muluk (d.1937), played in influencing 
his understanding of gender roles. 
Nawab Aaliya was related to the royal family of Persia through her mother. In 
1867, she married His Highness Aga Ali Shah and after his death assumed the primary 
responsibility for the education and upbringing of her son. She provided the Aga Khan 
with a well-rounded education, which he later acknowledged by noting “the inestimable 
advantage of receiving the fostering care of a gifted and far-seeing mother.”56  While 
women of Nawab Aaliya’s social class commanded sufficient material resources and 
even managed their properties and investments, it was the premature death of her 
husband - when the Aga Khan was only eight years old - that required her to take on an 
even more active role in the public affairs of the Ismaili community. She consciously 
presented herself as a model for Ismaili women and encouraged Ismaili girls to get an 
education. Malick notes that, “it was through her influence that social reforms were 
introduced in the community.”57 In addition, she took “unflagging interest”58 in the Aga 
Khan’s later international political endeavors and seems to have been his advisor and 
confidant. As the Aga Khan notes in his memoirs, “Each year that I went to India we 
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talked together as fully and as frankly about this [his work as the President of the 
League of Nations] as we had throughout my life shared our interests, our joys and our 
sorrows.”59  The model of leadership and independence that Nawab Aaliya presented 
must have undoubtedly impacted the Aga Khan’s conception of gender roles. The Aga 
Khan’s later efforts for improving the status of his female followers were thus likely 
informed by the examples put forth by his own mother and the many accomplished 
women with whom he was acquainted.
Conclusion: Implications for Ismaili Muslim Women Today
Aga Khan III’s recognition of women’s humanity informed his conceptualization of the 
wide-ranging roles they could perform in society. This influenced his thoughts on 
women’s education and distinguished him from fellow Muslim reformers. His reforms 
have had far-reaching impact on improving the quality of life of Ismaili Muslim women 
globally, and his work continues to be strengthened and expanded upon by his 
grandson, the present Imam of Ismaili Muslims, His Highness the Aga Khan. Today, a 
majority of Ismaili women are well educated and participate actively in the public life of 
the religious community.60 In the West, in common with other Muslim immigrants, they 
work outside their homes and such work is not stigmatized at the communal level. While 
hindrances to economic and social progress still exist for Ismaili women, the cultural 
barriers to obtaining education and employment have been significantly lowered. 
That said, since most of the reforms were initiated and sustained by the religious 
authority of Aga Khan III himself, Ismaili women did not feel the need to organize 
themselves on a large scale to demand their rights. For some time, this resulted in a 
lack of ownership and complacence in Ismaili women with regards to their own 
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development. This lack of ownership also meant that on occasion women’s 
development was taken for granted or even marginalized. Asani demonstrates that 
there have been times when the patriarchal culture reasserted itself and some of the 
Aga Khan’s reforms had to be toned down.61  This is in contrast to other groups of 
women who themselves have had to, and continue to, struggle to achieve an equal 
social and religious footing with men. Consider the case of the Daudi Bohra Ismailis in 
India at the turn of the century. Ghadially notes that the campaign for women’s 
education and emancipation was undertaken by a group of reforming Bohras 
themselves instead of the Dai (Bohra spiritual leader), Dr. Tahir Saifuddin.62  Bohra 
reformers agitated against the clergy’s control and wanted to bring an Anglo-vernacular 
education to the Bohra girls. As part of these efforts, they formed activist organizations, 
such as the Daudi Bohra Women’s Association, and published their thoughts in a 
magazine entitled Aage-Kadam (March Forward).63  Unlike the Nizari Ismailis who had 
the progressive leadership of their Imam, Daudi Ismailis had to struggle to obtain 
women’s emancipation. The situation, however, is changing for Nizari Ismailis under the 
guidance of the current Imam, who has encouraged leadership and organization of 
women at the grassroots level.
Like his grandfather, His Highness the Aga Khan has emphasized gender 
equality and women’s development as areas of focus. His strategy includes a 
combination of gender-specific and general socioeconomic reforms. For instance, 
during the last couple of decades of his Imamat, the inclusion of women in the Ismaili 
social governance institutions has gained more force, with the goal to appoint at least 
40 to 50 percent women in countries where qualified and educated women are 
available.64  In various countries, such as Afghanistan, Kenya, Portugal and United 
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Kingdom, women are appointed to the highest governance bodies to lead Women’s 
Activities portfolios. These portfolios spearhead social, economic and educational 
programming for Ismaili girls and women. 65 In addition, the creation of women’s groups 
at the level of the congregation is also encouraged.66 Such faith-based organizing within 
and across congregations can be a powerful way for Ismaili women to construct a 
politics that addresses their needs.67  These groups have immense potential for raising 
consciousness among Ismaili girls and women by providing them with a platform for 
engaging in critical reflections about their identity. Thus, contemporary Ismaili women’s 
organization and leadership is positioning them to supplement and sustain the efforts of 
the institution of the Ismaili Imamat.68 It would be fair to credit Sultan Mohamed Shah 
Aga Khan III for pioneering much of this reform, and His Highness the Aga Khan for 
taking these reforms to a new level.
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The Rise and Sublimation of the Woman Proletariat’s 
Politics in the Indian Women’s Movement
by Yogita Sharma
Abstract:  The history of the Indian women’s movement can be characterized as the 
history of its woman proletariat. At least since the 1920s, the constituents of this 
subaltern social group have been mostly agrarian or industrial working-class women. 
Yet, none of the widely read accounts of the Indian women’s movement have been 
written from the perspective of its working-class constituents. This paper traces the 
trajectory of the woman proletariat of India by providing a focalized reading of the 
accounts written by the historians of the Indian women’s movement. The questions that 
have guided this inquiry are: How do histories of the Indian women’s movement 
describe the rise of and the direction taken by the Indian woman proletariat in terms of 
producing a change in the social structures of religion and caste? What reasons do the 
histories of the Indian women’s movement provide for the success or failure of the 
Indian woman proletariat in achieving their goals as part of the Indian women’s 
movement?
The reconstitution of Indian society during the British Raj1  gave birth to the Indian 
women’s movement. This reconstitution spanned over two centuries beginning with the 
defeat of the Mughal Empire at the hands of the British East India Company in the late 
eighteenth century and ending with the birth of the modern Indian State in 1947. This 
period saw a questioning of religion during the Social Reform Movement of the 
Eighteenth century as well as the politicization of the masses during the Freedom 
Struggle of the early twentieth century. The processes that led to a breakdown of the 
feudal structure of Indian society also contributed towards the emergence of women as 
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a “subaltern social group”2 and marked the beginning of the Indian women’s movement. 
At least since the 1920s, the constituents of this subaltern social group have been 
mostly agrarian or industrial working-class women; therefore, the history of the Indian 
women’s movement can be characterized as the history of its woman proletariat.3 Yet, 
none of the widely read accounts of the Indian women’s movement have been written 
from the perspective of its working-class constituents. What one does find in these 
written histories are vignettes of this subaltern social group.
This paper traces the trajectory of the woman proletariat of India by providing a 
focalized reading of the accounts written by the historians of the Indian women’s 
movement. The questions that have guided this inquiry are: How do histories of the 
Indian women’s movement describe the rise of and the direction taken by the Indian 
woman proletariat in terms of producing a change in the social structures of religion and 
caste? What reasons do the histories of the Indian women’s movement provide for the 
success or failure of the Indian woman proletariat in achieving their goals as part of the 
Indian women’s movement?
The following section reconstructs a narrative of the agrarian and industrial 
working-class women of India from significant histories of the Indian women’s 
movement.4 The four-part division of this narrative is organized around three events that 
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could be considered watersheds in the trajectory of this subaltern social group. The first 
social reform period (early eighteenth century-1919) was a precursor to the mass 
involvement of working-class women. It still addressed issues that impacted them. It 
ended in 1919 with the onset of the Noncooperation movement that drew women of 
middle and lower classes into politics and saw the mobilization of the industrialized 
woman proletariat. The second period (1919-1947) ended with the Partition of 1947. In 
the aftermath of communal violence that surrounded Partition, working-class women’s 
issues were subordinated to placating communal identities and the project of nation 
building. In the second period there was a rise of women peasants and laborers through 
Communist and Maoist organizations. The third period (1947-1975) ended with the 
Emergency of 1975 after which numerous working-class women’s organizations 
reemerged with a challenge to the authority of the Indian State. This period saw a 
dissipation in the momentum of working-class women’s movement as its leadership 
splintered into those affiliated with left parties and those who chose to remain 
“autonomous” (or, non-politically affiliated).
Reconstructing the history of the woman proletariat of India
Early Nineteenth Century-1919. According to the written historical accounts of the 
Indian women’s movement, the first period was characterized by: (1) the social reform 
fervor of the nineteenth century, (2) the revivalism of the Freedom Struggle, and (3) the 
establishment of regional women’s organizations.5 At this stage, no mention is made of 
the woman proletariat’s involvement in the movement, which mostly involved educated, 
upper-class, and upper-caste men and women who saw religion and caste rather than 
economic exploitation as the root cause of women’s oppression in India.
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The first public effort to speak about women’s situation or gender relations in 
India began with the social reform movement in the nineteenth century. This movement 
was characterized by the disintegration of feudalism during the Mughal rule, the 
influence of Sufis, and the spread of education during the British Raj. The social 
reformers underscored the ways in which religion and caste legitimized distinctions 
between men and women, especially in terms of property and inheritance rights. Some 
of the social issues addressed by them were ‘sati’ (burning of a widow on her husband’s 
pyre), widow remarriage, marriage of the girl child, prostitution, and women’s literacy.
In the early 1900s, women of upper- and middle-class families founded regional 
women’s organizations. These women were educated and taught to imitate the ways of 
their British counterparts. Sarala Debi was one such woman who founded the Bharat 
Stri Mahamandal in 1910 with the hope of creating a nationwide platform for women of 
different castes and regions in India. However, the geographical reach of this 
organization remained limited. Another such organization, called the Women’s India 
Association (WIA), was founded in 1917 by Annie Besant. The WIA gradually grew to 
acquire a national character, but since the organization was born in the heat of the 
Home Rule movement and closely aligned with the Freedom Struggle, it remained 
fundamentally revivalist in nature. No nationwide women’s organizations were 
established in this period.
Thus, the histories of the Indian women’s movement argue that in the first period 
a successful questioning of religion went alongside the religious revivalism of the 
Freedom Struggle, which used notions of ‘Hindu tradition’ to mobilize men and women.6 
Partha Chaterjee argues that the ‘Hindu tradition’ constituted a distinction between the 
home and the world. The woman was situated at the heart of the domestic sphere and 
nurturing, self sacrifice, and domesticity were upheld as the essential feminine qualities. 
Furthermore, the Freedom Struggle’s discourse of a pure Hindu tradition had little room 
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for the identity of the Muslim community.7  This rhetoric had a severe impact on the 
construction of gender which was used as a site through which communal and anti 
colonial sentiment was constituted to legitimize the emergence of a supposedly secular 
Indian nation State. Thus, even though the question of social and religious reform was 
raised, it was subsumed under the religious revivalism that characterized the struggle 
against colonial rule. The issues raised among the regional women’s organizations 
founded in this period laid the groundwork for the conversations between future leaders 
of the Indian women’s movement.
1919-Independence from the British Raj in 1947. According to the histories of the 
Indian women’s movement, the second period of the Indian women’s movement was 
characterized by: (1) the large mobilization of women in the Freedom Struggle, (2) the 
mobilization of women working in factories and mills, and (3) the resurgence of 
communal tensions and violence.8  This stage is credited with the politicization and 
organization of working-class women and a rise in the awareness of women’s class-
based exploitation along with their social and cultural oppression.
Indian women began getting directly involved in the Freedom Struggle through 
the Swadeshi and Noncooperation movements. The Swadeshi movement began in 
1910 in opposition to the nonconsensual partition of the state of Bengal by the British 
and grew into a movement for self-reliance and self-sufficiency. The Noncooperation 
movement of 1919 arose in the wake of protests against the Rowlett Act (1919), which 
suspended the civil liberties of Indians. During this movement, women took to the 
streets in large numbers, stepping outside the norms of domesticity and modesty.
After 1919, women participated alongside men in the Civil Disobedience 
movement of the 1930s opposing the repressive laws of the British. Mahatma Gandhi, 
the leader of the Indian National Congress Party (or, Congress Party), initially opposed 
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the participation of women in the Dandi March (1930) - the highlight of the Civil 
Disobedience movement - but he later agreed to it. In the Dandi March, thousands of 
Indian men and women marched along with Gandhi for twenty-three days to the shores 
of Arabian Sea to the village of Dandi. Upon reaching the sea, they made their own salt 
to protest the British ban on Indians’ production of salt. In this event, women were 
arrested along with men for breaking the salt laws of the British and often beaten. 
Furthermore, during the boycott of foreign goods during the Civil Disobedience 
movement, women’s organizations such as the Ladies Picketing Board coordinated 
women’s processions and pickets, trained women in spinning the ‘charkha’ (portable 
yarn), selling ‘khadi’ (homespun cloth), and educating people on social evils like 
untouchability. These women enlisted masses in the movement. Women used shaming 
as a protest tactic to get back the goods that had been confiscated and sold by the 
British. They would boycott government auctions and wait outside to shame those who 
bought their goods into returning them to their rightful owners. 
The alignment of the women’s movement with the Freedom Struggle gave birth 
to nationwide women’s organizations, such as the All India Women’s Conference 
(AIWC), founded in 1927, which drew middle-class women out of their homes. This 
involvement with the Freedom Struggle wrested the Indian women’s movement out of 
the hands of the upper-class, upper-caste, educated men and women, and drew new 
constituents. While the earliest presidents of women’s organizations like the AIWC were 
upper-class or aristocratic women, by the 1930s the organization started electing 
activist presidents from within the movement cadre, which comprised of women from 
middle and lower classes. This expansion of constituents brought women of different 
classes, castes, religions, and ethnicities closer, to a certain extent. Imprisoned women 
‘satyagrahis’ “experienced solidarity with women from diverse class, linguistic and class 
backgrounds [but]…. this same solidarity was felt but not extended to non-political 
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prisoners such as prostitutes.” 9  Women prisoners refused to stay in their company for 
health reasons.
The new constituents of the women’s movement included both women leaders, 
who were mostly daughters of the first generation of feminists or women who had risen 
from within the movement, as well as the industrial and agrarian female proletariat. The 
influx of these new constituents brought a fresh perspective to Indian women leaders’ 
understanding of the oppression of women, which enabled them to mobilize working-
class women through the mass organizations of the left. This change in the 
understanding of women’s oppression by the second generation of feminists was a 
direct result of their involvement in the workers’ and peasants’ mobilizations that were 
taking place alongside the Freedom Struggle, even though the Congress Party had 
strategically left the peasant question out of its agenda of nation building, as evident in 
the Bardoli Resolution of 1928.10 The INC, however, did not fail to utilize the image of 
the self-sacrificing widow or female peasant for the consolidation of communal and 
anticolonial sentiment.
Another reason for the formalization of the industrialized woman proletariat was 
the effort made by the women’s organizations to articulate their demands alongside 
trade unionists. The WIA was one such organization with a membership of 3,000 spread 
between 65 branches that held regular meetings. It was the first women’s organization 
to raise the issue of maternity leave and benefits for women workers with the support 
some nationalists even before it was addressed at the founding meeting of the All India 
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Trade Union Congress (1920). The WIA’s repeated attempts led to the passing of the 
Bombay Maternity Leave Act in 1929, which was subsequently adopted by various other 
Indian provinces over the next ten years.  Similarly, in 1920, the Madras Women’s 
Indian Association took up the cause of a female mill worker who was dismissed without 
compensation in a mill employing the largest number of female laborers.
Another organization that took up the cause of women was the aforementioned 
All India Women’s Conference, established in 1927 by Margaret Cousins. In 1930, this 
organization held a special session on female labor and in the following year passed a 
resolution demanding that the Government of India pass a central maternity benefit act 
and that there be at least one women inspector in every factory. This resolution also 
demanded that all factories with a sizable number of female laborers provide a female 
doctor for ante- and post-natal care, a crèche, nursery school, and a maternity home. In 
subsequent years, they also asked for an inquiry into the conditions of women mine 
workers following a memorandum submitted to the Bombay Conference on Lahore, 
called by the National Council of Women (NCW) in India. However, the memorandum 
ended by saying that “the place for women is in the home in this day of building new 
India.”11 The communists who had entered Indian politics by the 1930s also organized 
women in Indian villages. Specifically, during the Bengal famine of 1943 they organized 
Mahila Amtaraksha Samitis (women’s self-defense committees), which eventually led to 
the growth of women Communists in West Bengal.
By the 1920s, female trade unionists had started gaining visibility in the industrial 
worker’s mobilizations. During the 1928-29 Bombay textile strike - a pivotal moment in 
the organization of female industrial labor in India - women were strategically placed at 
the front of the picket lines with the hope that the police would spare them the physical 
violence. In other strikes, women guarded picket lines with brooms in their hands and 
used humiliation as a protest tactic. Unfortunately, this interest in women workers came 
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too late. By this time, women were being retrenched from textiles and mines, the largest 
industries that employed them.
Between 1919 and 1947, there was a rise in communal tensions and violence 
between Hindus and Muslims that culminated in the partition of India and Pakistan and 
their independence from the British Raj on August 15th 1947. In the months before the 
scheduled date of the partition of India and Pakistan, women suffered massive 
emotional and physical brutalities, including displacement and homelessness in the 
wake of riots between Hindus and Muslims. Both Hindu as well as Muslim women were 
raped, their body parts mutilated as they traveled in trains or by foot to cross the newly 
drawn India-Pakistan border.
Women’s organizations were not immune to these communal tensions and riots. 
In the 1930s, the AIWC had addressed the issue of communalism in the context of 
national identity but for the next ten years the organization stood divided on whether it 
should limit discussions to non-contentious issues only or to continue to discuss all 
women’s issues. One such contentious issue, which drew protest from Hindu as well as 
Muslim factions, was a bill against child marriage, which the AIWC had already 
supported. Even though the organization managed to create a compromise within its 
warring factions on the bill in question, it split into two religious groups by 1945. After 
Partition, the Muslim women’s group formed the Pakistan Women’s Conference.
Thus, the histories of the Indian women’s movement argue that in the second 
period (191-1947) there was a rise of the industrial female proletariat. This subaltern 
group won maternity and compensation rights by aligning itself to trade unions as well 
as other women’s organizations. But this expansion of the constituents of the movement 
was quickly overshadowed by the communal events surrounding the birth of two nation 
states. The predominance of Hindu and Muslim religious identities, as an organizing 
force, left little room for the consolidation of the woman proletariat around Partition.
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1947-Declaration of the National State of Emergency in 1975. According to the 
histories of the Indian women’s movement, the third period of the Indian women’s 
movement was characterized by: (1) the failure of the newly independent Indian State to 
reform Personal Laws (laws pertaining to property and inheritance, marriage and 
divorce, and child custody) in the wake of communal tensions, (2) the rise of 
Communism and Maoism following the State’s laxity on land reforms, and (3) the rise of 
Gandhian socialism.12  It is argued that at this stage there was a concerted effort to 
organize the politicized female peasant for sharecropping and land rights, as well as 
against landlordism, whereas collective bargaining rights became the focal point for the 
struggle of industrial female worker. The movement expanded to include a narrow 
section of middle-class women concerned with issues of rising prices and wife-beating.
After Independence, the Indian government did not reform Personal Laws even 
though it had promised this to the feminists who had drafted a uniform and all-
encompassing code in the 1930s. Separate Personal Laws continued to exist for 
women of different religious communities in India and do so till the present day. The 
Hindu law, codified by the British in 1772 and based on ancient texts, had never been 
reformed. When the reformed Hindu Code Bill – that gave women the rights to divorce, 
maintenance, inheritance, and treated ‘dowry’ (bride price) as ‘stridhan’ (wealth of the 
woman) – was presented to the Constituent Assembly in1948, it faced strong 
opposition. After being delayed successfully, certain sections of this bill were passed as 
four separate acts between the years 1955 and 1956 after the first general elections 
that were held in independent India. These were the Hindu Marriage Act, the Hindu 
Succession Act, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, and the Hindu Adoption and 
Maintenance Act. Amidst protests from women’s groups, who wanted the reform in 
Personal Laws to include some kind of equality for women of all religion, the matter was 
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shut down by the Indian government and would only become the bone of contention 
between the Indian State and the women’s groups after the 1970s.
Even though there was no consolidation of the Indian women’s movement after 
1947, it continued to develop under the direction provided by the Maoists, Communists, 
and Gandhian Socialists.
The CPI (Communist Party of India) had been mobilizing factory workers since its 
inception in the 1930s. This trend continued after Independence. First, because the 
Indian peasants felt betrayed by the newly formed government on the question of land 
reform. Second, because India’s neighbor China was undergoing a revolution that 
enthused the Communist party workers. The newly independent Indian government’s 
tiptoeing around the issue of land distribution created a sense of disillusionment 
amongst ‘Kisan Sabhas’ (farmers’ assemblies) and provided an impetus to Maoists and 
numerous rallies, strikes, and demonstrations by share croppers. One such militant and 
historic struggle between the peasants and landlords in the Telangana district of Andhra 
Pradesh went on to liberate 2,500 villages, cancelled sharecroppers debts, suspended 
rent payments, and redistributed land between 1948 and 1950. A significant number of 
women peasants participated and were killed along with men in this movement. Another 
such militant struggle, called Tebhaga, was organized among sharecroppers and 
landlords of Bengal with the help of the CPI. In this struggle, women participated in 
large numbers once again leading to the politicization of women peasants in rural 
Bengal.
 The Telagana and the Tebhaga movements were put down by the government 
of India, and the CPI was outlawed in 1948; however, CPI members continued to 
organize working-class agitations in different sections of the population. In 1954 women 
members of the CPI formed India’s second largest women’s organization called the 
National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW). While the AIWC had always been 
connected to the Congress, the NFIW attracted broader sections of women workers and 
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peasants. In 1964, some members of the CPI split to form a new party the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist), or the CPI (M). Through these two parties of the Communists, 
left-leaning women’s organizations were formed in various states including Tripura, 
Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra. Many of these regional 
organizations that were affiliated to the CPI (M) coalesced into one organization, the All 
India Democratic Women’s Association, in 1982.
The other group that organized the woman proletariat along with a section of the 
middle-class Indian women comprised the Indian socialists, all of whom emphasized 
Gandhian principles in some way. Some examples of the movements organized by the 
Gandhian socialists were the Sarvodaya, Shahda, SEWA, and Nav Nirman. Sarvodaya, 
a movement organized to address untouchability, aimed to establish peoples politics 
rather than State politics through its leader Jaiprakash Narayan’s idea of total revolution 
through land redistribution in the 1950s. In one of the Indian states, this movement took 
a turn towards protesting against the production and consumption of liquor, which 
directly impacted and involved women. During the 1973 Shahda movement, tribal, 
landless female laborers were organized to protest against the extortionate practices of 
the landlords. The movement turned militant after the rape of two tribal women as the 
women of Shahda not only led demonstrations but also vocalized their protest through 
militant slogans and revolutionary songs. In negotiations with landlords, they were more 
adamant than men. Women who participated in Shahda also questioned gender 
oppression and raised issues such as wife beating by linking it with alcoholism. In 1972, 
SEWA, initially constituted as the women’s wing of the Textile Labour Association, 
made its first successful attempt at organizing a women’s trade union. SEWA focused 
on women’s working conditions, provided technical and collective bargaining training to 
women, and inculcated Gandhian ideals of work amongst them. The Nav Nirman 
movement, also influenced by the idea of the total revolution, began as a student-led 
agitation against rising prices, corruption, and black marketing in 1974. In a rare turn of 
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events, it soon gained massive support from the Indian middle classes in thousands. It 
turned into an all out protest against the Indian State. In the wake of Nav Nirman, many 
middle-class women became aware of their oppression.
Thus, the histories of the Indian women’s movement argue that in the third period 
the agricultural female proletariat made some gains in local struggles by being involved 
with Maoist or Socialist groups, but there was no consolidated national momentum to 
pressure the Indian government to reformulate laws pertaining to women’s land and 
property rights. In fact, the regional struggles were brutally crushed by the newly minted 
Indian government that stayed away from reforming Personal Laws based in religious 
codifications for fear of inciting communal sentiments. 
1975-The Demolition of Babri Mosque in 1992. According to the histories of the 
Indian women’s movement, the fourth period of the Indian women’s movement was 
characterized by: (1) revitalization of activity in women’s organizations due to the 
declaration of Emergency leading to a crisis in the legitimacy of the State, (2) a 
polarization between women’s organizations based on their desire to remain affiliated to 
a political party or remain “autonomous,” (3) a turn towards focusing on social issues 
such as violence, domestic violence, rape, dowry13, environmentalism, and (4) the rise 
of communal identity politics.14  Accounts of this period argue that there was a 
sublimation of the working-class women’s politics due to a polarization in the 
organizational strategies of its leadership.
Along with the declaration of a twenty-one month long state of Emergency in 
1975, during which Indians’ civil liberties as well as elections were suspended, two other 
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events led to the revitalization of the Indian women’s movement. These included the 
United Nations’ declaration of 1975 as the International Year of Women and the 
compilation and release of Towards Equality: Report of the Committee on the Status of 
Women in India (1974) by the Indian Government’s Department of Social Welfare in its 
wake.
In the previous period, the women’s movement had developed in close proximity 
with the working-class movement, be it the struggles of the rural peasant or the 
industrial worker of the city. By now, there were Indian feminists whose experiences 
came from mobilizing women in Socialist or Communist groups. Along with these there 
were women whose feminism had developed in the universities and educational centers 
of India. Regardless of their experience of participation in the women’s movement, 
these groups were in agreement over the fact that the oppression of women needed to 
be examined through a materialist framework.
In this milieu, two conferences were organized in the cities of Pune and 
Trivandrum in 1975. One of these conferences was organized by a coalition of women 
in Pune (in the state of Maharashtra), and the other was organized by the left-leaning 
School of Social Sciences in Trivandrum (Kerala). These conferences were to become 
indicative of the tendencies of the contemporary Indian women's movement as well as 
set its future pace. In these conferences, “the focus on rural women was defracted 
through particular interpretations.”15  In Pune, the focus was on organizing agricultural 
laborers, whereas in Trivandrum it was on abolishing landlordism. At both conferences, 
even though women’s oppression was examined in a materialist framework, no 
attention was given to “the fact that demands of work or wages were within the 
framework of capitalism, nor that peasant women had no claim to land, nor that 
agricultural laborers had no rights even to the huts they lived in-that is, ownership of the 
means of production (property rights of women) and political power were issues beyond 
The Rise and Sublimation of the Woman’s Proletariat’s Politics in the Indian Women’s Movement
108
15 Omvedt, Reinventing Revolution, 78.
their frame of reference.”16  Instead, both conferences ended by focusing on narrow 
definitions of women’s wages and work rather than forging a strategy to acquire access 
to land and means of production for the woman proletariat of India. The materialist 
understanding of woman proletariat’s oppression did convince the members of the Pune 
and Trivandrum conferences to continue organizing rural women, to focus on the 
revolutionary centrality of the female factory worker, to prepare women students as 
cadres for future mass organizing. However, they disagreed on whether to organize the 
woman proletariat by remaining affiliated to the parties of the left or working in 
“autonomous” groups. This gave rise to a schism in the movement on the question of 
organization. Specifically in Trivandrum, the dissenters rejected the control of the party 
and defined autonomy as: 
“…against bureaucracy and hierarchy they began to proclaim non-
structured, democratically functioning small group collectives as the ideal form of 
organization. They argued that the problem of the relationship of family/society 
and domestic labor/wage labor found its organizational parallel in the relationship 
between political struggle and social relations. Many feminists began to assert 
the meaning of autonomy as autonomy from the state, autonomy from the party, 
and autonomy from the class.”17
In the future, both groups would have to bear the burden of the organizational 
strategy they had chosen. For the autonomous groups, it would mean losing access to a 
mass base of working class women. For the Left affiliated groups, having access to a 
mass base came at a cost of it struggling to build consensus among women of different 
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classes and they had to bear the additional burden of fighting women’s oppression in 
trade unions and the party.
The autonomous organizations had a sporadic existence, aligned themselves 
with feminists in university and academic circles, and also took advantage of foreign 
funding and non-government organizations. All this “provided resources for organizing 
and exchange of ideas, but in a way that institutionalized a different kind of hierarchy 
between those at top of such organizations and the people” and eventually, they 
developed a “deep alienation from politics” and “failed to mobilize mass activities.”18 
Their counterparts aligned with Communist organizations continued to organize women 
peasants in Mahila Samitis (women’s groups) through the party or through trade unions. 
Within trade unions, the women of the CPI (M) constituted the Women’s Working 
Committee through which they raised the specificity of women worker’s demands. The 
schism between the autonomous and the Left affiliated women’s organizations diluted 
the momentum of the Indian women’s movement. It shifted the focus from 
fundamentally speaking of land, property, or religious reforms to social issues of dowry 
and violence (domestic abuse, rape). The relationship between economic and social 
causes of women’s oppression began to be defined through a narrow definition of 
women’s work. As this rift was taking shape, a majority of India’s peasants moved from 
being sharecroppers to wage laborers, an issue which led to a decline in the female 
peasant population in India but was not highlighted at the time.
Numerous women’s organizations continued to be established in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. For example, the ‘dalit’ (lower caste) women formed the Mahila Samta 
Sainik Dal, which rallied against religion as the cause of oppression of dalits; women 
from earlier Maoist movements formed the Progressive Organization of Women; and 
the Working Women’s Committee of CPI (M) constituted itself into a nationwide 
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organization called the All India Democratic Women’s Association in 1982 with support 
from CPI (M)’s regional women’s organizations.
Despite the cleavages in the question of organization, groups of the Indian 
women’s movement continued to form issue based alliances with one another. For 
example, in the 1980s, seven women’s organizations led an intensive and coordinated 
campaign against dowry that led to a change in laws. After a prolonged campaign by 
women’s organizations (in which AIDWA took the lead), a criminal law was passed 
introducing Section 498-A to the Indian Penal Code under which “cruelty to a wife was 
made a cognizable, non-bailable offence, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment 
and a fine.”19 Furthermore, “Section 113-A of the Evidence Act was amended to lessen 
the burden of proof on the complainant.” Another amendment to Section 174 made it 
compulsory to have a post-mortem of a women’s body who died within seven years of 
marriage. At the height of this movement, numerous families that had taken dowry were 
put to shame through neighborhood campaigns. The passage of laws did create the 
legal framework to punish the culprits even though dowry still plagues Indian society in 
open as well as insidious ways.
Rape was another issue on which Indian women’s organizations formed 
alliances. At the center of this campaign was the case of an eighteen-year-old girl called 
Mathura who was taken to a local police station and raped by the policemen there.20 
Raising awareness about this case and other similar cases resulted in 1983 to an 
amendment to the Burden of Proof clause according to which a man was considered 
innocent until proven guilty. While feminist groups wanted this clause changed in all 
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rape cases, the 1983 Bill only covered custodial rape. Even after this legal victory, the 
issue of rape met with numerous setbacks, as the Indian courts found ways to shift the 
burden of proof back to women victims by miring the case in tortuous definitions of the 
woman’s conduct or behavior. The leaders of these campaigns soon realized that “there 
was no connection between enactment of laws and their implementation” which led 
them to follow single cases through the courts.21 The feminists realized that “their earlier 
methods of agitation such as public campaigns, demonstrations, street theatre … had 
limited meaning unless they were accompanied by attempts to develop their own 
structures to aid and support individual women.”22 This led to the formation of women’s 
centers, which provided a mixture of legal aid, health care, and counseling, in several 
Indian cities in the 1980s. 
Some other issues that were brought to the fore through the contemporary 
women’s movement were environmentalism, women’s health (especially with respect to 
forced contraception in the context of Indian State’s focus on poverty reduction and 
population control), female feticide, ‘sati,’ reservation of seats for women in central and 
state assemblies, and, more recently, women’s sexuality.
The issue that became the most controversial for feminists of this period was that 
of Personal Laws. This issue gained prominence in the contemporary women’s 
movement through the case of Shah Bano in 1985. Shah Babo was a Muslim woman 
whose husband had divorced her using triple “talaq” and was subsequently granted 
maintenance of rupees 179.20 per month by the Madhya Pradesh High Court of India23. 
However, Shah Bano’s husband, Mohammad Ahmed Khan, an advocate, appealed to 
the Supreme Court of India, arguing that no such maintenance was necessary for more 
than three months after divorce according to the Islamic law of Shariat. Shah Bano’s 
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counsel also used verses from the Koran to counter Mohammad Ahmed Khan’s 
interpretation of “maintenance on divorce” (a part of Personal Laws in India), rather than 
arguing for “maintenance on destitution” under Section 125 of Indian Penal Code. The 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Shah Bano and urged the Indian government to frame a 
common civil code but not before getting embroiled in a controversy around the lines of 
distinction between Personal Laws codified according to the religious laws of a 
community and civil laws. The verdict enraged the newly formed Muslim Personal Law 
Board who considered it as an assault on the identity of Indian Muslims. Since the 
Supreme Court judgment had targeted Muslim law specifically, it also came under 
criticism from other secular groups of the Indian civil society. Indian feminists were 
enraged that this judgment and the controversy surrounding it had hijacked the issue of 
women’s Personal Laws (which included women of different religious communities, not 
just Muslim women) to belittle the Muslim community. In this controversy, and to 
immensely simplify the terms of the debate, the lines were drawn between those who 
wanted a Uniform Civil Code and do away with separate laws for separate religious 
communities and those who wanted to reform the Personal Laws of every religious 
community from within. The issue of women’s Personal Laws became a communal 
issue because since the 1980s, there had been a steep rise in Hindu-Muslim and 
Hindu-Sikh communal violence. Since 1984, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), had 
“launched an agitation demanding that a shrine in the precincts of the Babri Masjid be 
declared the birthplace of Ram.”24  Given this communal atmosphere, the Congress 
government in power at the Centre retraced its commitment to push for a bill that would 
reform Muslim law for the women of its community in order to placate the sentiments of 
the Muslims.
During this controversy, the autonomous women’s groups supported the creation 
of a uniform civil code for Indian women, whereas women’s groups aligned with the 
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Communist parties argued for “equal laws, equal rights” or the reform of Personal Laws 
from within the religious framework. The latter also argued for the creation of an equality 
of rights between men and women. The feminists of the autonomous group were shut 
out of discussions within communities to which they did not belong (for example, the 
Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Muslim Women was formed to oppose the 
Muslim women’s bill that would truly reform laws limited its membership to Muslims).25 
The dialogue between Muslim religious boards such as this and women’s organizations 
was kept alive by the women’s organizations affiliated with the Communist parties. The 
Shah Bano controversy gave credence to the idea that rights of women and religion 
were not separate and distinct.
Thus, the histories of the Indian women’s movement argue that in the fourth 
period there was sublimation of the politics of the woman proletariat in the wake of 
communal politics. However, the weight and continuity of the Indian women’s movement 
lay on the shoulders of its working class women. One of the widely cited reasons for this 
sublimation is the inability of the leaders of the movement to forge a unified movement, 
after having vocalized their differences on the question of organization. Along with the 
fracturing of the movement from within, religion and communal identities continued to 
stand in the way of overhauling the legal framework which denied women ownership of 
the means production to women.
Conclusion
Gramsci provides the clearest conceptualization of the relationship between the 
dominant “historic bloc” and emergent social orders constituted by subaltern social 
groups. He argues that subalterns comprise those groups in civil society whose 
interests are not realized by, and who are in opposition to, the ruling groups that control 
the modern State. They are somewhat formalized by participating in the processes 
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through which the ruling classes constitute themselves in the form of the modern State 
out of an older set of political relations, however, they are incapable of uniting on their 
own and need an organization (political party, trade union, or an organization of their 
own) to unify them and forge a struggle to realize their interests.26  Gramsci uses the 
conceptual vocabulary of Classical Marxism to argue that the relationship between a 
social context and its subaltern social groups manifests through the organization and 
leadership both of which mediate between the older or dominant and the emergent 
social orders. The organizational form enables a rupture in the transformation of 
hegemony or the “cultural-social unity” that forms the basis of a “historic bloc” in which 
the leaders or ‘organic intellectuals’ mediate between the dominant and emergent social 
orders by bringing into existence “new formations which assert the autonomy of the 
subaltern groups, but within the old framework.”27
A reading of the significant histories of the Indian women’s movement produces a 
narrative that follows Classical Marxism’s account of the formation of a subaltern social 
group. To summarize the history of the women’s proletariat’s politics reconstructed 
above: there was a rise of a subaltern social group which searched for an organizational 
form and the “organic intellectuals” that would enable its organic/natural progression 
leading to a remaking of gender relations (and, consequently, civil life) in India; 
however, at every critical juncture this subaltern social group lost momentum as its 
leadership was unable to rupture the alignment between the State legitimizing 
processes and religion. The hegemony or the “cultural-social unity” on which an older 
historic bloc rested left no space for the articulation of the gender question in the light of 
the narrative of work and property. At one level, this narrative of the Indian woman 
proletariat’s politics seems reasonable by closely following Classical Marxism’s account 
of the trajectory of a subaltern social group. But, at another level, it also makes us 
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wonder if we are reading the history of the Western proletariat into the Indian female 
proletariat’s struggle.28
Once again, Gramsci comes to our assistance in this regard. He reminds us to 
pay attention to “the objective formation of the subaltern social groups, by the 
developments and transformations occurring in the sphere of economic production; their 
quantitative diffusion and their origins in pre-existing groups, whose mentality, ideology 
and aims they conserve for a time” in order to understand “[t]heir active or passive 
affiliation to the dominant political formations, their attempts to influence the 
programmes of these formations in order to press claims of their own, and the 
consequences of these attempts in determining processes of decomposition, renovation 
or neo-formation.”29
Paying heed to his argument we might want to inquire into questions which the 
histories of the Indian women’s movement are yet to answer: How have the industrial 
and agrarian working-class women of India been impacted by transformations occurring 
in the sphere of economic production such as industrialization, urbanization, and 
migration? Is there a subaltern social group called the working-class Indian women 
outside of the trade unions, Maoist groups, and environmental activists? How has 
association with these and other groups enabled and constrained the momentum of the 
working-class women’s movement?
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Interpreting the Sindhi World: Essays on Society and History
edited by Michel Boivin and Matthew Cook
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010)
reviewed by Natasha Raheja
In one praiseworthy sweep, Interpreting the Sindhi World: Essays on Society and 
History (2010) moves explorations of Sindhi histories and identities away from the 
periphery of humanities and social sciences scholarship and into a wider thematic 
context.  The editors of this volume, Michel Boivin and Matthew A. Cook, view Sindhi 
identity as complex and integrally intertwined with larger social and historical 
conceptions of South Asia and its many diasporas.  With this volume, Boivin and Cook 
successfully unite the field of “Sindh/i studies” across disciplinary lines. In their 
introduction to ten separate contributions which comprise the volume, the editors argue 
that Sindhi identity is not fixed and remains in constant negotiation. They propose a 
comparative approach for the nuanced reading of historical and socio-cultural influences 
that inform diverse Sindhi experiences and voices throughout history. 
 More specifically, Michel Boivin and Steven Ramey’s articles complicate the 
Hindu-Muslim binary through respective case studies that render this taxonomy over-
simplistic and unable to aptly characterize the diversity within Sindhi religious and ritual 
practices.  Isolating three Sindhi Hindu guru movements, Ramey shows how each 
group differs from the other, maintaining unique ideological beliefs.  Further, Boivin’s 
examination of the complicated social structure amongst the followers of the fifteenth 
century saint Pithoro Pir, locates this cult in a hybrid Sufi space and outside of the Hindu 
and Muslim binary.  In another essay, Lata Parwani examines the socio-historical 
influences that shape the many narratives of the Sindhi folk icon, Jhuley Lal and 
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unpacks his constructed prominence and deification in recent times.  
 In other contributions, Matthew A. Cook turns prevalent notions of Sindhi identity 
and contemporary migration history on their head as his analysis of eighteenth century 
migrations of Khatris from Punjab into Sindh convincingly contends for a notion of 
Sindhi identity that is long since mobile. Cook presents an alternative historical narrative 
in which movement related loss that is embedded within contemporary Sindhi 
imaginaries is now concomitant with gain and identity itself as forged by the very 
permeability of state formations.  Oskar Verkaaik investigates the development of the 
Sindhi nationalist movement constructed on a premise in which Sindhiness is a natural 
phenomenon that is grounded in the perception of a shared Sufi mystical identity.  His 
essay raises many provoking questions regarding the configuration of diasporic Sindhis 
and non ethnic-Sindhis into the socialist nationalist movement. Farhana Ibrahim uses 
nationalist writings and oral histories in her poignant questioning of the ability of master 
narratives of Gujarati regional identity and history to accommodate the significant Sindhi 
presence in its western most regions.  In conversation with Ibrahim’s article, Rita 
Kothari’s essay examines the Gujarat based urban Sindhi community’s internalization of 
a struggle for acceptance through insightful anecdotes from community members. 
 Maya-Khemlani David’s transportation of the reader to Malaysia, Paulo Lemos 
Horta’s re-visiting and concomitant re-reading of Richard Burton, and Vazira Fazila-
Yacoobali Zamindar’s insightful focus on the understudied efflux of immigrants from 
Karachi all complement the volume in its aims to facilitate the recognition of Sindhis in a 
complex global community and interconnected social web.
 Despite the wide scope of these essays, there are, however, some significant 
omissions. The rich literary and musical traditions belonging to the Sindhi world which 
are integral to its social fabric are not the central focus of any of the ten component 
essays. Also, while the Introduction notably cites the burgeoning role of media 
technologies, particularly the Internet, in the imagination of Sindhi communities and 
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identities, the collection does not include an in-depth exploration of the utilization of 
media tools in contemporary cultural preservation and revival movements. 
Furthermore, the volume could have benefited from the inclusion of an essay concerned 
with the long history of water politics that continue to shape life in the Sindh province. 
Lastly, while the essays can be read stand-alone and in any order, some prescribed 
grouping or sectioning would have been helpful for the reader in navigating the various 
dimensions of the Sindhi world, as presented in this book.
 Nevertheless, in their cross-disciplinary interpretations, these ten essays both 
sketch and blur the boundaries of Sindhi identities and illustrate to the reader that there 
are many Sindhi worlds with reach and resonance far beyond the territorial borders of 
the Sindh province. In my knowledge, no previous volume stitched with the thread of 
Sindhis, Sindhiness, or Sindh, in and of itself, covers the wide spectrum of chronologies, 
disciplines, geographies, and religions traversed in this book.  Such a scope yields the 
rich presence of many, diverse Sindhi experiences and voices in this collection. In the 
editors’ comparative approach, lies the celebration of a fused cultural Sindhi identity that 
is aware of both the overt and subtle fissions that simultaneously operate within Sindhi 
communities. 
 This book is useful for those interested in acquiring a broad introduction to 
Sindh/i studies as well as those readers interested in the intersections of diasporic 
culture, migration, nationalism, and religious practice for their roles in shaping historical 
memory and social practice at large.  Out of this edited volume, Sindhi identities and the 
worlds they comprise emerge as profoundly dynamic and intricately complex, 
encouraging and inviting further critical study in new directions. 
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